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THE ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY LAW
James Y. Stern*
This Article examines a characteristic of property entitlements fundamental to
the structure of property systems that has received scant academic attention, a
characteristic referred to as the mutual exclusivity principle. According to this
principle, a property system does not allow for the existence of incompatible
rights. Two people cannot separately be the owners of the same resource, for
instance. By contrast, two people can each hold valid but contradictory con-
tract rights to the resource. Although the existing property literature has
stressed the “exclusive” nature of property, the various ways in which property
is imagined to be exclusive, such as by conferring “rights to exclude,” fail to
capture the essence of property as a distinct legal institution. Unlike these
alternative conceptions of exclusiveness, the mutual exclusivity principle holds
true across the range of different types of property entitlements, including not
just fee simple ownership but also security interests and servitudes, and across
the range of assets subject to property law, including not just land and physical
objects but also intangibles like intellectual property and corporate shares.
Recognizing the role of the mutual exclusivity principle yields a number of
practical insights. It helps explain various institutional features of property
law, such as the system of future interests, the use of possession-based rules, the
role of recording systems, and the negative, thing-based structure of property
entitlements. It illuminates connections between property and other fields like
corporations law and it calls into question aspects of existing doctrine, such as
the preferred status of exclusion rights under the U.S. Constitution’s Takings
Clause. It also modifies the influential theory that property law is heavily
shaped by problems of high information costs: while existing accounts seem to
suppose that property law entails relatively high information costs because it
imposes a relatively broad set of duties on others, many of the information cost
problems identified in the literature actually result from the mutual exclusivity
problem, rather than from the breadth of property duties.
At a more general level, understanding the centrality of the mutual exclusivity
principle suggests some change in direction is called for within the wider prop-
erty literature. American property scholarship has been preoccupied with
questions about the scope and strength of property rights, overlooking the sep-
arate problem of ascertaining who happens to hold a given right, a problem
distinctive to property law. Property, this Article argues, is at least as much
about title chains, patent searches, and creditor priorities as it is about tres-
pass, remedies, and eminent domain.
* Associate Professor, William & Mary Law School. For their helpful comments, I am
grateful to Vladimir Atanasov, Will Baude, Lynda Butler, Jud Campbell, Nate Chapman, Chris
Essert, Michael Green, Andrew Gold, Tara Grove, Dmitry Karshtedt, Greg Keating, Brian Lee,
Hal Lloyd, Irina Manta, Robert Miller, Chris Newman, Tom McSweeney, Tom Merrill, Nate
Oman, Henry Smith, Jay Thomas, Andrew Verstein, Katrina Wyman, and participants in the
faculty workshop at Wake Forest and the Association for Law, Property, and Society 2014
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Introduction
Two people cannot both be complete owners of the same thing: if Amy
owns Blackacre, then Bob does not, and vice versa. This statement requires
some clarification. Amy and Bob can certainly be co-owners, with each
holding what is effectively a 50 percent share of the property. Such divisions
are sometimes described by saying that each co-owner holds an “undivided”
interest in the property, but that is just a way of expressing the notion that
both owners have equal rights in the asset they jointly own.1 It does not
mean that each holds a separate ownership, unencumbered by the other’s
interest. It simply isn’t possible for Amy and Bob both to own 100 percent of
Blackacre individually, independent of one another. That would be absurd.
It may take a moment to absorb this idea—precisely because it is so
obvious—but it is fundamental to the structure of property law. Suppose,
for instance, that Blackacre was originally owned by Olivia and that Olivia
made separate contracts to sell Blackacre, one with Amy and one with Bob.
As far as contract law is concerned, it is altogether possible that both con-
tracts are valid and binding.2 If Olivia then conveys the property to Amy, she
annual meeting. Additional thanks go to the William & Mary deanery for supporting the
William & Mary Private Law Theory Workshop. Any errors are mine exclusively.
1. See Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 343 (8th ed. 2014); Note, Creation of Joint
Tenancies, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 214, 214–15 (1910). It may also be a way of describing rights of
survivorship.
2. See infra notes 52–54.
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will be liable to a suit by Bob for breach of contract; if she conveys to Bob,
she will be liable to a suit by Amy. In contract law, rights to Blackacre can be
multiplied. In property law, however, they cannot. It simply isn’t possible
for Olivia to convey separate and independent ownerships to both Amy and
Bob. Why not? Because that’s just how the concept of property works.
The example just given illustrates what this Article will call the mutual
exclusivity principle in property law, a core attribute of property that to date
has received little attention, or even recognition, from scholars. The mutual
exclusivity principle holds that if one person’s property right is legally valid,
no one else can hold valid a property right that contradicts it. The concept
of a property system does not allow for the coexistence of rights with mutu-
ally exclusive content. It is structured as a kind of zero-sum game, in which
the validity of one right necessarily means other incompatible property
rights cannot also be valid.3 This is true not only for ownership rights but
for all rights classified as property.
Appreciating the mutual exclusivity principle helps reshape debates
about the idea of property and the role that property plays within a larger
legal system. The last decade has seen a proliferation of interest in the theo-
retical underpinnings of private law, and especially of property.4 In particu-
lar, scholars have sought to understand the formal structure of property and
the features that distinguish property from other branches of law, like con-
tract—what are referred to as questions of “essentialism” in property law.
Without a doubt, the overwhelming focus of attention in this sometimes-
contentious debate has been the supposedly exclusive character of property.5
3. Sometimes this means a claim will receive no legal recognition whatever. If O pur-
ports to sell the same sculpture to A and to B, only one will get an enforceable right. Suppos-
ing the right goes to A and A then dies intestate and without heirs, for instance, the sculpture
will escheat to the state, rather than shift to B. B has no trace of a legal right. In other situa-
tions, however, the losing claim will simply be reconfigured so as not to conflict with the
winning one, as when one security interest is subordinated to a prior, recorded interest. The
right is recognized, but only to the extent it does not conflict with the superior interest. Actual
conflict is disallowed. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (Am Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n
2014).
4. See, e.g., Symposium, New Dimensions in Property Theory, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1853
(2012); Symposium, The New Private Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1640 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions (2011); J.W. Har-
ris, Property and Justice (1996); Ben McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law
132–204 (2008); J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (1997); Laura S. Underkuf-
fler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power 89–90 (2003); Shyamkrishna Bal-
ganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions,
31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 593 (2008); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of
Property, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 531, 597–600 (2005); Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of
Sticks or a Tree?, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 869, 873 (2013); Christopher Essert, Property in Licences and
the Law of Things, 59 McGill L.J. 559 (2014); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Prop-
erty Law, 58 U. Toronto L.J. 275 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Ex-
clude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730, 740–52 (1998); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The
Property/Contract Interface, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 773, 789–99 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill &
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface]; Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces
Back Together, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 371, 379–403 (2003); Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of
Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691, 1704–05 (2012); Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a
1170 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:1167
It is widely thought that property often has something to do with exclusive-
ness, and the question is just how important exclusiveness is to its structure
and operation.
Commentators understand this exclusivity quite differently, however,6
and differences between competing understandings are often overlooked.7
Sometimes exclusivity is thought of as a matter of absolute control over an
individual resource,8 sometimes as a matter of rights to exclude others,9
sometimes as a private domain of independent decisionmaking.10 These
competing versions of exclusivity ultimately give rise to different under-
standings of what property is and does, which can have important practical
Thing or a Bundle?, 32 Seattle U. L. Rev. 617 (2009) (book review); Francisco J. Morales,
Comment, The Property Matrix: An Analytical Tool to Answer the Question, “Is This Property?”,
161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1125, 1129 (2013).
6. The exclusive character of property is described in a variety of different linguistic
formulations. See, e.g., Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984) (“the right to use [a]
physical thing to the exclusion of others” (quoting Passailaigue v. United States, 224 F. Supp.
682, 686 (M.D. Ga. 1963))); Property, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (“exclusive
right”); 1 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty 107 (1973) (a form of control from
which “all others are excluded”); John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy 218
(W.J. Ashley ed., Longman, Green & Co. 1929) (1848) (a right of “exclusive disposal”); Pen-
ner, supra note 5, at 103 (a “right of exclusive use”); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analy-
sis of Law 39 (9th ed. 2014) (“rights to the exclusive use of valuable resources”); Armen A.
Alchian, Property Rights, in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics 422 (David R. Hen-
derson ed., 2008) (“exclusive authority”).
7. For an example of the three notions of exclusivity identified in this Article running
together, see Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 Yale L.J.
601, 604 (1998) (remarking that Blackstone’s unqualified depiction of ownership has proven
powerful because rights to exclude suggest a “property owner has a small domain of complete
mastery, complete self-direction, and complete protection from the whims of others”).
8. This view is associated with Blackstone’s famous description of property as “sole and
despotic dominion.” 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2.
9. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994) (“[T]he right to exclude
others[ is] ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly charac-
terized as property.’ ” (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))); Int’l
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essen-
tial element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it.”);
Joseph William Singer et al., Property Law: Rules, Policies, and Practices, at xxxiii
(6th ed. 2014) (“It is often said that the most fundamental right associated with property
ownership is the right to exclude non-owners from the property.”); Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 347, 354 (1967) (“Private
ownership implies that the community recognizes the right of the owner to exclude others
from exercising the owner’s private rights.”); Merrill, supra note 5, at 730 (“[T]he right to
exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the
sine qua non.” (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176)).
10. Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and Natural
Property Rights, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1379, 1422 (2010) (“[T]he landowner enjoys a do-
main of free use and enjoyment exclusive of outside interference.”); see also Eric R. Claeys,
Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L.
Rev. F. 133, 143 (2012) [hereinafter Claeys, Exclusion and Private Law Theory], http://harvard
lawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/forvol125_claeys.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XFQ-Q5U7].
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implications. To give one example, federal copyright law, echoing the lan-
guage of the Constitution’s “Intellectual Property Clause,”11 grants copyright
holders various “exclusive rights” in their creations,12 while patent law grants
patent holders the “right to exclude.”13 Are these the same thing?14 And do
these forms of exclusivity mean copyrights and patents should be treated as
property rights?15
Despite its importance and the attention it has received from scholars,
exclusivity in property law remains poorly understood. The prevailing un-
derstandings of its exclusive character all overlook the most fundamental
element of exclusivity in property law, the mutual exclusivity principle—
though the principle seems to be an assumption that they each depend upon
and take for granted. This Article argues that the mutual exclusivity princi-
ple is one of the critical conceptual lynchpins that hold the institution of
property together and reflects the most basic functional concerns that ani-
mate it. In contrast to the sorts of exclusivity discussed in the existing litera-
ture, the mutual exclusivity principle holds true for property entitlements of
all kinds, not just fee simple ownership, and it effectively describes the
boundary that distinguishes property rights from rights not considered to be
property. Other exclusivity-based accounts of property are generally unable
to explain what is exclusive about entitlements like a security interest or
ownership of an assignable debt claim, much less why these are classified as
property entitlements.
The thesis of this Article is not normative but descriptive and concep-
tual. It seeks to understand property from the inside, partly because this is a
valuable perspective in its own right but also because a richer understanding
11. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment,
48 UCLA L. Rev. 1057, 1068 (2001) (expressing regret that “[t]he ‘exclusive rights’ clause has
become the ‘intellectual property’ clause”).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012).
14. No, according to Judge Giles Rich, a major figure in the development of modern
American patent law: “[T]he Patent Act of 1952—enacted 47 years ago—changed the wording
of the grant from ‘exclusive right’ to ‘right to exclude others.’ Your readers may think the
distinction unimportant, but it is important because it often affects legal reasoning.” Janice M.
Mueller, An Interview with Judge Giles S. Rich, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 9
Fed. Cir. B.J. 75, 77 (1999); cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006)
(“Like a patent owner, a copyright holder possesses ‘the right to exclude others from using his
property.’ ” (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932))).
15. Compare Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (“The franchise which the
patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or
vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all that he obtains
by the patent.”), and Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and
Policy: Cases and Materials 49 (6th ed. 2013) (“Unlike other forms of property, however, a
patent includes only the right to exclude and nothing else.” (emphasis omitted)), with Frank
H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 108, 112
(1990) (“[A] right to exclude in intellectual property is no different in principle from the right
to exclude in physical property.”).
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of the formal architecture of property is necessary for any sophisticated anal-
ysis of the institution, whether functional or normative. Before we can eval-
uate property in its various manifestations, we must first understand how it
works, and in many ways its conceptual structure remains hidden in plain
sight.
Recognizing the mutually exclusive structure of property rights gives us
a better grasp of property in a number of ways. It sheds light on the origin
of a variety of distinctive doctrinal and institutional features in property law,
such as the system of future estates, titling mechanisms and recording proce-
dures, reliance on possession, and the use of rights in individual “things” to
organize property law. The mutual exclusivity principle also provides gui-
dance in areas of law in which a test to distinguish between property and
other legal relationships is needed; it also calls into question the apparent
premises behind various doctrines affecting property, such as the rules con-
cerning “per se” takings under the Takings Clause.
A clearer appreciation of the mutual exclusivity principle also suggests
shifts in the wider landscape of property theory. In particular, it offers a
friendly corrective to accounts of property that stress the role of information
costs. The information cost perspective, which has dominated much recent
scholarship on property, starts from the premise that it is generally harder to
communicate the content of property entitlements than other kinds of legal
rights because property entitlements bind a relatively large set of people; in
consequence, the argument goes, property is often formalistic and rigid be-
cause relatively blunt rules can make it easier for individuals to determine
how the system requires them to behave.16 Yet the most serious information
costs faced in property law often stem not from difficulties in ascertaining
the content of the duties property imposes on strangers but from difficulties
in figuring out who holds a given property entitlement—the problem of
determining which of two asserted claims will prevail since their contradic-
tory content means one of them must fail. For the most part, it is these sorts
of issues that many of the relatively formal features of property law identi-
fied in information cost accounts—most famously the tendency to standard-
ize property rights—can be said to address.17
16. The classic account is given in Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Stand-
ardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1, 31–34
(2000) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization]. See also Smith, supra note 5, at
1706–07; Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 Stan. L.
Rev. 1105, 1160 (2003).
The role of informational burdens faced by property institutions has been explored by
others, both before and after Merrill and Smith began their collaboration. See, e.g., Clarisa
Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 465, 476–82 (2004); Peter S.
Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. Legal Analysis 1,
26–29 (2013); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 Geo. L.J. 885, 893–900
(2008). See generally Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence
from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83 (1989); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the
Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (1985).
17. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 16 (discussing stand-
ardization of property forms).
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The mutual exclusivity principle is at once obvious and hard to see, but
neither of these excuses lack of attention to it. Property scholarship today
gives inordinate attention to questions concerning the scope of rights against
outsiders—questions like the proper limits of an owner’s right to exclude,
the choice between injunctive and damages remedies, and the appropriate-
ness of Takings Clause protection, to give a few examples.18 But much of
property law is concerned not with the strength of a given entitlement but
with determining who happens to hold it. This is not to deny questions
about access and exclusion a central role in the story of property law. But it
is to recover at least equally central problems like title contests and priority
disputes. When we picture property, we should have these kinds of proceed-
ings in mind no less than trespass or nuisance suits. Titling issues reflect the
core task that property law performs in determining who has claims on ex-
ternal things bearing no intrinsic connection to any person in particular.
And they arise from the fact that property rights are governed by the mutual
exclusivity principle, which makes it impossible for two people with other-
wise compelling claims upon an asset each to receive property rights to it
when those rights are incompatible.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I first surveys three principal ways
in which exclusivity is understood within current debates about property
and then introduces the mutual exclusivity principle. Part II demonstrates
the primacy of mutual exclusivity, showing how it is crucial to distinguish-
ing a variety of different types of property holding from other types of legal
relationships, in contrast to rival accounts of exclusivity in property. Part III
identifies a number of implications for scholarship of property law, calling
attention to its effect in shaping property doctrines and suggesting ways in
which recognition of its role alters understandings of property more
broadly.
I. The Sense of Exclusivity
A. Prevailing Notions
To understand the significance of the mutual exclusivity principle, it is
useful to begin with a brief sketch of the different accounts commentators
have given of property, with special emphasis on the way in which they have
understood property to be “exclusive.”19 While many theorists accept that
there is an important sense in which property involves some sort of exclusiv-
ity, discussions of property invoke rather different notions of what this ex-
clusivity entails, often without realizing it.
The first and simplest of these imagines that a property entitlement
gives a single person undivided control over a given resource, concentrating
18. See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
19. Cf. Balganesh, supra note 5, at 596 (“The idea of exclusion, in one form or the other,
tends to inform almost any understanding of property . . . .”)
1174 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:1167
authority “in a one-person, one-resource fashion.”20 We may call this the
Blackstonian conception, consistent with Blackstone’s famous reference to
property as “sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exer-
cises.”21 While this view does appear to ground a good deal of thinking
about property law,22 the Blackstonian conception is exaggerated at best, as
those who invoke it undoubtedly understand.23 Rights to resources can be
jointly held by multiple people or divided in all sorts of different ways.
Think of leaseholds, bailments, security interests, and trusts, to name just a
few. As a kind of ideal type, the Blackstonian conception may be useful in
understanding ownership, but it has little to say about the variety of ways in
which rights in resources are commonly divided among a variety of different
stakeholders.24
A second view of property centers on the “right to exclude,” said by the
U.S. Supreme Court to be “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property.”25 In contrast to the
Blackstonian understanding, which centers on the concentration and scope
of property rights, this exclusion conception locates the exclusive character of
property in the way the duties imposed by those rights are defined.26 The
conduct that a property right regulates is described in terms of an objective
boundary, such as a plane of space, that duty bearers are forbidden to cross.
Those boundaries originate in some external “thing” from which the person
20. Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2061, 2095 (2012); see
also Dow v. Gould & Curry Silver Mining Co., 31 Cal. 629, 637–38 (1867) (endorsing the view
that property gives the owner “the right to enjoy and dispose of certain things in the most
absolute manner, as he pleases, provided he makes no use of them prohibited by law” (quoting
2 John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 394 (Philadelphia, George W. Childs 1864))); Salt Lake
City v. E. Jordan Irr. Co., 121 P. 592, 604 (Utah 1911) (Straup, J., dissenting) (“[Any proprie-
tor] has the right to an exclusive possession of its property, to the sole right to use, to enjoy, to
control, and to dispose of it.”).
21. 2 Blackstone, supra note 8, at *2 (emphasis added).
22. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 9, at 355–57; Merrill, supra note 20, at 2095; cf. Richard
A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36
J.L. & Econ. 553, 557 (1993).
23. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357, 361 (2001) [hereinafter Merrill & Smith, What Happened]; see
also David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 Theoretical Inquiries L.
103, 106–17 (2009).
24. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L.
Rev. 965, 1002 (2004) (arguing that Blackstone’s depiction of property “does describe the
strong default package of rights emerging from the exclusion strategy,” which helps to save
“much delineation cost”).
25. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); see also Balganesh, supra note
5, at 628; Merrill, supra note 5, at 730 (calling the right to exclude property’s “sine qua non”).
26. See Balganesh, supra note 5, at 628 (“[The right to exclude] ought to be understood
as doing little more than stipulating that others are placed under a correlative duty to exclude
themselves from performing those activities in relation to the identified resource.”).
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subject to such a duty can be said to be excluded.27 The right to exclude, in
short, is the right to deny someone else access to a thing.28 To be clear, this
doesn’t mean all access by all people. It is true that discussions of the exclu-
sion conception often combine it with a Blackstonian sensibility, implicitly
assuming that the right to exclude is relatively unqualified both in the range
of people it entitles the right holder to exclude and in the circumstances in
which they may be excluded.29 But the two notions of exclusion are concep-
tually distinct. A right to exclude does not have to be at all absolute.30 As
Thomas Merrill, perhaps the leading proponent of the exclusion conception
puts it, “[T]o the extent one has the right to exclude, then one has prop-
erty,” but property does not “require[ ] a certain quantum of exclusion
rights.”31 Property entitlements can be bigger or smaller, stronger or weaker.
The right to exclude simply provides the measure of their size and strength.
The third major understanding of exclusivity downplays the notion of
trespass and boundary crossing central to the exclusion conception and in-
stead looks at property rights as a matter of protection against interference.
This view, which I will refer to as the shielding conception,32 imagines that
27. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1849, 1862 (2007) (“The right to exclude directs us to very simple signals of boundary
crossing, in a nonreciprocal fashion.”).
28. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1823, 1828–29 (2009) (“[The right to exclude] empowers the owner to prevent others from
using, occupying, or taking her property.”).
29. There is also a tendency to conflate the right to exclude with strong “property rule”
remedies. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). While the two
may reinforce each other or serve a common purpose, see Henry E. Smith, Property and Prop-
erty Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1754–74 (2004), they are nevertheless conceptually distinct,
see Balganesh, supra note 5, at 599–600, 607–09; see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).
30. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev.
439, 458 (2004) (“A patent confers ‘exclusive’ rights in the sense that it confers the right to
exclude, but it does not give the sole right to exclude.” (emphasis omitted)). There may never-
theless be some connection between the right to exclude and its scope. When the right is made
more fine-grained, some of the advantages of exclusion (i.e., of using thing-boundaries to
define rights) may be undermined. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S453, S454–55 (2002). The right to
exclude will always be subject to limitations, however, which is to say that reliance on bound-
ary-crossings alone is not realistic. See id. at S454–55, S470. From the standpoint of informa-
tion costs, the real issue isn’t how substantial limits on the right are but how easily they are
communicated.
31. Merrill, supra note 5, at 753.
32. The term is meant to draw a parallel with the so-called shielding thesis about legal
rights more generally. See H.L.A. Hart, Legal Rights, in Essays on Bentham: Studies in
Jurisprudence and Political Theory 162, 171 (1982); Matthew H. Kramer, Rights Without
Trimmings, in A Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries 7, 11–13 (Matthew H.
Kramer et al. eds., 1998).
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property begins with individual entitlements to use a resource, which prop-
erty law then protects by requiring others to refrain from wrongfully inter-
fering with that use.33 If the core example of the exclusion conception is
protection against trespass, the core example of the shielding view is protec-
tion against nuisance.34
There is some ambiguity about just what role exclusivity plays in the
shielding conception. Broadly speaking, the shielding conception views
property as exclusive because it elevates the position of those who hold
property entitlements over those who do not.35 In part, the shielding con-
ception sees exclusivity in the simple fact that a property right36 differenti-
ates some people from others by conferring a special legal status upon them,
quite apart from any consequences following from that status.37 But the ac-
tual legal consequences often seem to be part of the story as well. The effect
of property holding is that the law gives special normative weight to prop-
erty holders in a variety of interrelated ways.38 It grants a domain of author-
ity, allowing the right holder to act according to her own designs and
obliging others to conform to her decisions.39 Exclusivity on this reading
seems to have to do with the supremacy of those who hold rights in a partic-
ular item of property over those who do not. The interests and actions of the
property holders take precedence and must be accommodated by
nonholders.
33. See Larissa Katz, The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution
in Property Law, 55 McGill L.J. 47, 77 (2010) [hereinafter Katz, The Moral Paradox]. Propo-
nents of the shielding conception tend to resist a purely formal characterization of property,
arguing it leaves out important features. In particular, it is suggested that the use-right that
property law seeks to protect through rights against outside interference is limited in ways
internal to the law of property, such as productive activity or appropriately social behavior. See
Larissa Katz, Spite and Extortion: A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Property Right, 122 Yale
L.J. 1444, 1448–51 (2013) [hereinafter Katz, Spite and Extortion].
34. To be sure, proponents of the shielding view acknowledge that the law often relies on
boundary-crossings to define rights, but they view this only as a matter of convenience, rather
than a reflection of anything intrinsic to property as an institution. By the same token, exclu-
sion theorists may see the protection of interests in use as the underlying purpose behind the
right to exclude, but they view the use of boundaries as more central to what makes property
“property.” See Smith, supra note 24, at 981; Henry E. Smith, Response, Mind the Gap: The
Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 959,
964 (2009).
35. More than the other two understandings of exclusivity, the shielding conception is a
collection of different ideas, not a monolith, and grouping various accounts of property under
this heading necessarily smooths over nuances and subtleties. See Katz, supra note 5, at
277–78.
36. Shielding accounts are often explicitly limited to ownership, rather than property
holding more generally, but the basic concept can be borrowed for wider extension. See, e.g.,
id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 5, at 372–76 (discussing the “integrated unity” of the
property rights of use and disposal).
39. See Claeys, Exclusion and Private Law Theory, supra note 10, at 143; Katz, supra note
5, at 290.
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The Blackstonian, exclusion, and shielding conceptions thus describe the
exclusive nature of property, and property itself, quite differently. The Black-
stonian view stresses the concentration and breadth of rights over resources,
the exclusion view focuses on the use of boundary-crossings to define duties
on others, and the shielding view stresses the way in which property law
distinguishes those who hold a property right from those who do not.
B. The Mutual Exclusivity Principle
While each of these perspectives has its uses—and abuses—none of
them captures the form of exclusivity most fundamental to the basic struc-
ture of property as a distinct legal concept. A property system generates
“exclusive rights” in the sense that a valid property right precludes the possi-
bility of any other property right that contradicts it. In this way, property
law is organized according to what may be called the mutual exclusivity prin-
ciple. The mutual exclusivity principle holds that a property system disallows
the existence of multiple valid entitlements with mutually exclusive con-
tent.40 This is a statement about property, not a definition of it, but any
definition omitting this characteristic would miss something essential.41
The mutual exclusivity principle applies to other types of property enti-
tlements besides ownership rights, but ownership offers a clear example and
a useful starting point. Suppose, for instance, Jolyon draws up a will in
which he seeks to dispose of a house he owns called Robin Hill. In the will,
however, Jolyon inadvertently includes two separate provisions, one leaving
the property to his wife Irene and another to his son Jon. A court tasked
with interpreting the will can side with Irene or it could side with Jon. It can
even divide rights in the property among them, though in practice it is un-
likely to do so. What the court cannot do, however, consistent with the in-
ternal logic of property law, is make Irene and Jon each the complete owner
of the entire property in the sense that Jolyon was.42 It cannot create two
separate and complete ownerships. Title to the property can be divided and
subdivided, but it cannot be multiplied.43
Hints of this idea abound in discussions of property but are easy to
overlook amid talk about property as a right to exclude or a right of exclu-
sive use.44 As one nineteenth-century attorney emphasized in a successful
40. I am tempted to say that property entitlements are compossible, except that I want to
avoid any suggestion that the argument here rests on acceptance of one position in the so-
called specification debate among rights theorists, on which see infra note 62.
41. I would say that it is a necessary but not a sufficient condition, but I do not want to
give the impression that it operates like a law of physics or an axiom of deductive logic.
42. E.g., Bacon v. Nichols, 105 P. 1082, 1082–83 (Colo. 1909) (finding that estate should
be split between two parties rather than making both parties complete owners); Covert v.
Sebern, 35 N.W. 636, 637 (Iowa 1887) (finding that estate should be split in face of conflicting
clauses); Estate of Blount v. Papps, 611 So. 2d 862, 863 (Miss. 1992) (finding in favor of one
party in an ambiguous will instead of making both parties complete owners).
43. See McFarlane, supra note 5, at 16–23.
44. Cf. Posner, supra note 6, at 40 (stating that private property creates proper incen-
tives “by parceling out mutually exclusive rights to the use of particular resources”).
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argument before the Mississippi Supreme Court, “There cannot be two in-
dependent owners of the same property,” for to multiply property rights in
the same asset “would be inconsistent with the idea of property: property
being the exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing.”45
It is easy to misread such statements as expressions of the kind of hyper-
bolic, Blackstonian view of property described earlier.46 But the remark
wasn’t meant to suggest that it is impossible for a property right to be held
jointly by two people or for two people to hold different rights in a single
asset. Such arrangements effectively divide the larger right or collection of
rights between the joint right holders.47 What the statement meant is that
there cannot be two separate ownerships of Blackacre.48 The proposition is so
fundamental that it usually goes without saying, but it pervades the judicial
business of property law. As the Louisiana Supreme Court explained nearly
two centuries ago, “[T]here cannot be two owners for the same thing[.]
Joint ownership indeed, when several persons have a right to claim portions
of a thing the law recognises, and the mind readily conceives, but the mo-
ment one person is made entire owner, no other person can he held such.”49
Perhaps this seems self-evident. In a sense, it ought to be. Property is an
everyday institution and this principle is written into its DNA. The idea
should be second nature.50 But it is not the only arrangement we can imag-
ine, or indeed, the only arrangement the law ever adopts. Most obviously,
45. Olive v. Walton, 33 Miss. 103, 109 (1857) (emphasis added).
46. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. In fact, Blackstone himself may be
somewhat misunderstood. When Blackstone described property as dominion claimed over
external things “in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe,” 2
Blackstone, supra note 8, at *2 (emphasis added), he may also have had in mind not simply
the caricatured view of property as absolute dominion described earlier but the way one prop-
erty right rules out contradictory ones. There may be a hint of this idea as well in Locke’s
influential account of property. See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government § 27, at 288
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (arguing that when a thing is removed
by an individual from the “common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something
annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men”).
47. Confusingly, this is spoken of as an “undivided” right in some contexts. See, e.g.,
Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 343. Nevertheless, cotenancy is necessarily different from
sole ownership. See Foster v. Boch Indus., Inc., Civil No. 08–5093, 2009 WL 485407, at *2
(W.D. Ark. Feb. 26, 2009) (“Full ownership and co-ownership are mutually exclusive . . . .”).
48. Olive, 33 Miss. at 109.
49. Hewes v. Pierce, 1 Mart. (n.s.) 357, 362–63 (La. 1823); see also Utah ex rel. Div. of
Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. United States, No. 2:97CV927K, 2005 WL 2087869, at *4 (D.
Utah Aug. 24, 2005), aff’d, 528 F.3d 712 (10th Cir. 2008); Webster v. Foster, 81 Mass. (15
Gray) 31, 34 (1860); Boylan v. Kelly, 36 N.J. Eq. 331, 335 (1882); cf. John Minor Wisdom, A
Trust Code in the Civil Law, Based on the Restatement and Uniform Acts: The Louisiana Trust
Estates Act, 13 Tul. L. Rev. 70, 70 (1938) (discussing civil law resistance to the idea of separate
legal and equitable ownership given principle that the same property cannot have two separate
owners).
50. Cf. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the
Functions of Theory, 45 J. Legal Educ. 313, 384 (1995) (“The most fundamental ‘super-
schemas’ in the culture, by whatever name, are so pervasive and intrinsic to the conventions of
thought that we are quite unaware of them.”).
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the mutual exclusivity principle does not apply in contract law.51 So, for
example, if Jolyon had made separate contracts to sell Robin Hill to Irene
and to Jon respectively, it is entirely possible both contracts would be legally
valid.52 Of course, Jolyon cannot transfer 100 percent property ownership to
both of his promisees, given the mutual exclusivity principle that governs
property entitlements. But so far as contract principles are concerned,
Jolyon can create binding obligations to both Jon and Irene, giving rise to a
suit for damages by either or both of them, even if they cannot both be
awarded specific performance.53 The conceptual structure of property is thus
markedly different from contract.54 Property establishes what contract rights
themselves ordinarily cannot: priority of rights against third parties.
One way to understand this idea is in terms of traditional statements
that property is an “in rem” right or a right that is “good against the
world.”55 This is commonly taken to mean that property imposes duties on
all other legal actors—most obviously, a duty not to trespass.56 In this sense,
it is said that rights of bodily security are also “in rem” insofar as everyone
owes a particular person certain duties not to cause that person physical
harm by, say, punching the person in the nose.57 But there is an altogether
different sense in which property rights are good against the world or in
rem. A right that imposes duties on only one person or that consists only of
51. In principle, tort law might be thought to be committed to the mutual exclusivity
principle as well, but because tort rights tend to be personal to their holders, there is usually
no dispute about the identity of the person whose rights are violated if a tort has indeed
occurred, making it easier to ensure that the mutual exclusivity principle is satisfied, and as a
result, it need not be taken as seriously and does not appear to exert as pronounced an effect
on tort law’s institutional structure. See discussion infra notes 99–100.
52. See, e.g., Energy Labs, Inc. v. Edwards Eng’g, Inc., No. 14 C 7444, 2015 WL 3504974,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2015) (defendant’s conflicting contractual obligations to third party do
not excuse performance); see also Restatement of Contracts § 464(2) (Am. Law Inst.
1932) (“The right to damages of a promisee in a bargain who has been given ground by the
promisor at the time of its formation to believe that the promisor has neither already made
other bargains nor will make later bargains limiting his possibility of performing all his
promises, is not diminished by such other bargains.”); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 773 (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (no tort action for interference with contract where one party
seeks to compel performance of its contract even if this will result in breach of separate con-
tract between promisor and a third party).
53. Much as if Jolyon had promised to sell an asset he didn’t own or that didn’t even
exist. On the enforceability of such contracts, however, see Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts § 266 cmt. b, illus. 9 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
54. See Michael B. Dorff, Selling the Same Asset Twice: Towards a New Exception to Corpo-
rate Successor Liability Rules, 73 Temp. L. Rev. 717, 719 (2000) (discussing conflicts involving
noncompete clauses).
55. For now, I will treat these as synonymous, although the phrase “in rem” literally
refers to a thing (res) as the focal point of the right, which “good against the world” does not.
56. See, e.g., Penner, supra note 5, at 27–28.
57. See id. at 28.
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the absence of any duty58 can still be good against the world insofar as it
defeats everyone else’s contrary claims.59 The right is in rem because it is
legally applicable to everyone else, even if it does not purport to regulate
their conduct.
It should be fairly apparent how the mutual exclusivity principle differs
from the Blackstonian and exclusion conceptions discussed above. The mu-
tual exclusivity principle is not a matter of entitlements being either broad
in scope or imposing duties defined in terms of boundary-crossing. It may
be harder to appreciate the difference between mutual exclusivity and the
shielding conception, but the difference is important. The shielding view
generally describes the nature of a property entitlement in terms of the rela-
tionship between owners and nonowners.60 Nonowners are differentiated
from and subordinated to owners in various ways, and nonowners can thus
be said to be excluded from some normative status or power that owners
enjoy.61 But this understanding of exclusivity as a matter of legal haves and
have-nots doesn’t speak to the possibility of rival, competing haves: the no-
tion at the heart of the shielding conception that nonowners must defer to
owners leaves open the possibility that there are other owners with totally
separate ownerships of their own. It is easy to take the absence of such rights
for granted, precisely because it is so basic and universal a feature of prop-
erty. But it is quite a different thing conceptually from exclusivity in the
shielding sense and it reflects a different set of concerns. The paradigmatic
problem from the standpoint of the shielding conception is nuisance—ac-
tions by one person that interfere with a property holder’s plans for her
property. The paradigmatic problem from the standpoint of the mutual ex-
clusivity perspective is a title defect—someone else’s rival claim to the same
resource.
The argument that property rights are exclusive in this way isn’t meant
to suggest that property law consists in a kind of perfect and pure deductive
logic.62 Nor is it meant to imply that other branches of law are oblivious to
58. A privilege, rather than a claim-right, in the Hohfeldian framework. See Wesley New-
comb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J.
16, 32–33 (1914).
59. So, for example, there can be in rem privileges, not just in rem claim-rights. See id.
60. See Katz, Spite and Extortion, supra note 33, at 1450; Katz, The Moral Paradox, supra
note 33, at 77.
61. See Katz, supra note 5, at 278; see also Katz, Spite and Extortion, supra note 33, at
1450 (describing the shielding conception with more generality); Katz, The Moral Paradox,
supra note 33, at 77.
62. See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1627, 1734 (1991); see
also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577, 604–05 (1988); cf.
Ronald Dworkin, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A Matter of Princi-
ple 119 (1985) (articulating a version of the right-answer thesis). I also want to distinguish the
claims here from those advanced in the so-called specification debate among theorists of
rights. Compare Hillel Steiner, The Structure of a Set of Compossible Rights, 74 J. Phil. 767
(1977), with Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights, 79–104 (1990). Insofar as those
theories pertain to the entire enterprise of rights holding and therefore suppose that what is
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what has been called the law’s “eternal triangles”—the problem of conflict-
ing legal claims.63 The mutual exclusivity principle is a general ordering pre-
cept in property, not a mathematical axiom or scientific law. It is one of the
ideas that shapes the basic concept of property, but that does not mean that
every question arising in property law raises interesting questions about the
priority of rights (although priority questions often play an underap-
preciated background role, even when they aren’t the center of attention).64
It also bears noting that while mutual exclusivity may generally make
rule-like, bright-line legal doctrines more attractive, the concept of mutual
exclusivity does not logically require them—that is, the mutual exclusivity
principle is not a function of the ex ante clarity of the law in establishing
which of two competing rights prevails. The idea is internal to the law and it
is minimally present even if priorities are somewhat uncertain, so long as it
is understood that contradictory property rights are out of order.65 It may be
unclear whether A or B is the true owner, but what is critical is that the
concept of property still instructs that only one of them can be the true
owner. The practical benefit of structuring entitlements according to the
mutual exclusivity model may be undermined if rules to resolve the conflict
are vague and uncertain, but the structure itself doesn’t depend on their
predictability.
Another cluster of related ideas that should not be confused with the
mutual exclusivity principle has to do with rules governing the alienation of
property. These include the notion that one person cannot sell or give away
what belongs to another without the other’s consent; that property rights
“run with” an asset in the sense that the package of property rights in an
asset does not grow or diminish when the package is transferred from one
person to another;66 and that contests between two or more people claiming
rights in the same resource are resolved on the basis of a first-in-time rule
(first to possess, first to record, first to file, first to the courthouse, etc.). All
of these are symptoms of the mutual exclusivity principle but are neverthe-
less conceptually distinct, and though they tend to track it, the correlation is
contingent and subject to exceptions.
true for property law is equally true for contract law, they necessarily mean something quite
different from the idea about property advanced here.
63. See A. James Casner & W. Barton Leach, Cases and Text on Property 179
(1950); see also Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of the Law”: Toward a Theory of
Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 95 (1991). Thus, for instance,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include various devices intended to address problems in
which a party may owe conflicting duties to different parties. See James Y. Stern, Property,
Exclusivity, and Jurisdiction, 100 Va. L. Rev. 111, 174–75 (2014).
64. See infra Section III.C (discussing numerus clausus idea).
65. There are limits, of course, as there would be for almost any claim about how legal
doctrine operates if the law were entirely indeterminate.
66. In other words, successive holders of property acquire the same rights their predeces-
sors held, no more and no less.
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Thus, for example, if one person separately sells the same painting to
two purchasers, the basic rule is that the first purchaser wins. This is associ-
ated with the notion that, having transferred property rights to the first pur-
chaser, the seller has nothing left to give to the second, an idea known as the
“nemo dat” principle.67 It also reflects the view that the first purchaser’s
rights, having been validly transferred and thus “vested,” cannot be termi-
nated without her consent. Yet although this is the law’s default position, the
rule is frequently modified so that the second purchaser prevails over the
first if, say, the second is a purchaser in good faith or the first has failed to
record the transfer to her. From the standpoint of mutual exclusivity, it
doesn’t matter whether the first or the second purchaser wins, only that they
do not both win in the sense of being considered an undivided owner or
holder of complete title to the property. That said, the first-in-time principle
has an especially close connection with mutual exclusivity because of the
nemo dat conceptualization lying in back of it.68 The idea that what has been
given away cannot also be retained not only generates priority rules, but
paints a picture of property that makes mutual exclusivity a central feature.
Before turning to some more particular instances of the mutual exclu-
sivity principle, it may be helpful to round out the discussion that has devel-
oped thus far with a metaphor. In recent years, property scholars have been
debating the appropriateness of describing property as a “bundle of sticks”
or “bundle of rights.”69 Without meaning to take sides in that dispute, let me
offer another metaphor and suggest that property can be thought of in
terms of a pie.70 The law of property divides the world into discrete things,
delineated in terms of geographic location, physical material, or some other
set of differentiating characteristics. Those things operate as a kind of short-
hand for a cluster of activities in which human beings might engage; “Black-
acre,” we may say, is really a way of describing a set of actions, defined as
those occurring within a particular segment of three-dimensional space.
What property law then does is to assign control over those activities to
individuals or groups, conceiving of those actions first and foremost in
terms of the resources whose use they involve. In this way, we can imagine
that for each resource, there is a kind of pie representing 100 percent of the
67. “Nemo dat quod non habet,” meaning no one can sell what he does not have. See
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Is Article 8 Finally Ready This Time? The Radical Reform of Secured Lend-
ing on Wall Street, 1994 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 291, 296. See generally Donald J. Kochan, Dealing
with Dirty Deeds: Matching Nemo dat Preferences with Property Law Pragmatism, 64 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 1 (2015).
68. Cf. Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2097,
2120–25 (2012) (discussing advantages of treating nemo dat as a general baseline rather than
as an exception).
69. See Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 57 (2013); Claeys, supra note 5, at 621–29; J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights”
Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 711 (1996). See generally Symposium, Property: A Bundle
of Rights?, 8 Econ J. Watch 193 (2011).
70. I am not alone in seeking to sidestep the bundle debate. See Craig Anthony (Tony)
Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
281, 283 (2002); Robilant, supra note 5, at 873.
May 2017] The Essential Structure of Property Law 1183
authority to decide how the resource will be used—the complete set of ac-
tions that count as “uses” of the resource. One person might be assigned the
entire pie, in keeping with the Blackstonian archetype, or the pie might in-
stead be divided in a slew of intricate ways. What is useful about the pie
metaphor is that it makes clear there is a kind of zero-sum model that gov-
erns the distribution of rights—if half the pie is given to A, then B cannot
hold two-thirds of it. That is what the mutual exclusivity principle means.
II. The Primacy of Mutual Exclusivity
This Part will provide some additional examples of the mutual exclusiv-
ity principle to help make what has thus far been a fairly abstract discussion
more concrete. It will do so, however, in the course of laying out the princi-
pal thesis of this Article: that the disallowance of mutually exclusive rights is
not only a characteristic of property law but an essential aspect of property
as a legal institution. The thesis rests upon several interrelated claims. First,
the mutual exclusivity principle holds true for property rights generally. It
applies just as much to property forms like security interests and servitudes
as it does to ownership rights and just as much to property entitlements in
esoteric assets like accounts receivable and corporate shares as to land, foxes,
or diamonds. By contrast, the sorts of exclusivity imagined by the Black-
stonian, exclusion, and shielding accounts generally struggle to assimilate
these other forms of property holding. Second, the mutual exclusivity prin-
ciple effectively captures the difference between property rights and other-
wise similar legal rights not considered to be property. It is the special sauce
that turns nonproperty entitlements into property ones.71 Finally, mutual
exclusivity accounts for much of where the action is in property law. In real
life, questions about title to property occupy lawyers as much, if not more,
than questions about the scope of the rights an acknowledged property
holder may assert against strangers.
A. Standard Property Paradigms
A review of some of the classic forms of property shows the ubiquity of
the mutual exclusivity principle and its role in distinguishing property rights
from otherwise similar legal entitlements. It also shows the comparative de-
ficiencies in both respects of the standard accounts of exclusivity in prop-
erty. To be clear, these three alternative notions of exclusivity are pure forms,
and the arguments here treat them with analytical strictness that may not be
fully consistent with the way they are thought of by those who adopt them.
It may be possible in some cases to bend these rival conceptions so that they
reach a wider range of property paradigms. My contention, however, is that
those efforts are strained and that at their core, their purpose is to speak to
71. Cf. Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property 24 (1990) (“[T]he idea of property
is indeterminate at the margin. No litmus test can separate rights of property from, say, those
of contract in all cases.”).
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other features of property law than those that the mutual exclusivity princi-
ple highlights.
1. Security Interests
Take a simple mortgage. In conventional property talk, creating a mort-
gage is described as moving one of the sticks in the owner’s bundle to the
mortgagee. The mortgagee acquires a sort of contingent interest in the prop-
erty, redeemable in the event the owner-mortgagor defaults on her loan.
Consistent with the mutual exclusivity principle, property law reconciles the
mortgagee’s right to the owner-mortgagor’s property with the claims of
both other would-be security holders and of other owners in the event the
owner-mortgagor attempts to transfer the property. In general, the mortga-
gee’s claim will typically preclude the claims of subsequent mortgagees and
of new owners who acquire the property from the original one. The real
point, though, is that regardless of how it resolves the conflict, the law of
property will supply a resolution. The one result property rules out is the
mortgagee holding a valid mortgage and the new owner holding an unen-
cumbered fee simple interest. The two are mutually exclusive.72 And it isn’t
hard to see what the functional payoff here is. A security interest is meant to
provide security.73 By offering assurances of priority, the security interest
enables the owner-mortgagor to reduce the risk of nonrepayment that might
otherwise discourage a lender from lending money.74 Mutual exclusivity is
important to security interests not simply in some conceptual sense but in
carrying out their core function.
Mutual exclusivity is not only an important attribute of security inter-
ests but one that largely explains why they are classified as property rights. It
is tempting to assume that the proprietary hallmark of a security interest is
simply that it provides rights to a resource—a claim on a parcel of land in
the case of a real estate mortgage—but this is too imprecise. It isn’t enough
that the right provided implicates an asset owned by the borrower. Suppose,
for example, that the effort to create a security interest in a given instance
fails because some formality is not observed. Nevertheless, suppose also that
the contract between lender and borrower expressly provides that the lender
can repossess the borrower’s property if the borrower defaults and that this
right is valid as a matter of contract law. In short, it creates a repossession
72. See Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic Registra-
tion System’s Land Title Theory, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 111, 115 (2011) (“[I]f a mortgagee
fails to record its mortgage properly and then someone subsequently buys or lends against the
home and records its interest, the subsequent purchaser or lender often can take priority over
the first mortgagee.”).
73. See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143, 1143 (1979) (“One of the principal advantages of a se-
cured transaction is the protection it provides against the claims of competing creditors.”).
74. The wisdom of allowing such assurances has been questioned. See, e.g., Alan
Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 1051 (1984). That is beside
the point made here, however.
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right for contract purposes only, rather than a property-based security inter-
est. What is the difference? The difference lies in the effect on third parties:
would-be transferees claiming to have acquired the collateral property from
the borrower, those with valid security interests in it, and unsecured credi-
tors generally, including anyone else with a similar contractual right to re-
possess.75 On each of these scores, a true security interest will generally
confer more robust rights than its purely contractual analogue.
By contrast, it is difficult to see much of a role in this arrangement for
the other forms of exclusivity described earlier. The Blackstonian view does
not fit in at all, given that the transaction itself speaks of dividing rights in
an asset among multiple parties. But the right to exclude fares no better.
One might say that it entails an inchoate or potential right to exclude in the
event of default, but that would be true of the purely contractual right to
repossess. In fact, the security interest might not even amount to that, since
the mortgagor will in many instances be entitled only to the proceeds from
the sale of the mortgaged property, rather than to ownership of the property
itself. And the shielding conception seems equally beside the point. A secur-
ity interest cannot easily be described as creating any kind of exclusive do-
main of action, at least in a way that distinguishes it from any other legal
right.
2. Future Interests
Much of what has been said about security interests can be extended to
future interests, though the set of seemingly arcane rules governing future
interests has a different emphasis. Rather than casting matters in terms of
priority, the system of “estates”76 hardwires the mutual exclusivity principle
into the doctrines that define different claims on a resource across time,
carving the total package of rights in a resource into distinct temporal por-
tions. The law of future interests supplies a menu of different cookie cutters
that divides the sum total of rights to control a given resource over time.
Thus, if A receives a contingent remainder in Blackacre, then B cannot hold
a fee simple absolute in it. Since the rights a contingent remainder confers
overlap with those a fee simple confers, if one of these claims is valid, the
other is not.77 The whole point of the system of estates is that if one person
75. Cf. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three’s a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi and Me-
lamed’s One View of the Cathedral, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 394, 492 (1999) (“[T]he universe of
property is never two party in nature.”).
76. What is known as the system of estates in land is a bit of a misnomer, for it now
primarily does business as a way of dividing beneficial interests in trusts, which can hold a
wide range of different types of assets, including intangibles. See Bernard Rudden, Things as
Thing and Things as Wealth, 14 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 81 (1994).
77. Cf. In re Estate of Del Guercio, 501 A.2d 1072, 1074 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1985)
(stating that if a husband’s death “vests the fee in his wife under a tenancy by the entireties,
[it] cannot, on rational analysis, also vest a dower interest in the same property,” since the two
estates are “mutually exclusive”). Though the focus here is on intertemporal divisions, it is
true for other aspects of the estate system as well. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell (In re Estate of
Mitchell), 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 192, 196–97 (Ct. App. 1999) (“Property cannot be held both as
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or group receives rights obtaining during a particular slice of time, that slice
is not available for others to hold. This is reflected in what has aptly been
called the doctrine of “conservation of estates,”78 according to which all pre-
sent and future interests “must at all times add up to the whole bundle, a fee
simple.”79 There can be no holes and no overlaps.80
Mutual exclusivity again helps distinguish these rights from their closest
contractual analogues. The owner of Blackacre can enter into valid contracts
with two different people, promising to convey to each of them the same
future interest in the property, just as the owner of Blackacre can enter con-
tradictory contracts to sell a present ownership interest to them. The conflict
will be resolved, damages will have to be paid, and the “true” property right
will be awarded to one party or the other. The point is that it is only when
one right invalidates another that we think we are talking about a property
entitlement, rather than a merely contractual entitlement concerning
property.
As with security interests, other notions of exclusivity fail to account for
future interests. The very existence of future interests is in tension with the
Blackstonian view of property. The exclusion conception fares little better. A
future interest is not a matter of rights to prevent others from using a re-
source. It is a matter of title—of allocating rights—as of particular points in
time. A future interest may eventually entitle its holders to ownership, which
will indeed entail rights to exclude, but this eventual right does not describe
what is distinctly property-like about a future interest before it has matured
into a present possessory one. The content of the legal right is largely irrele-
vant to the nature of future interests and the problem that the system of
future interests attempts to solve. One could have a right taking effect next
Thursday to exclude people from Blackacre, but one could equally have a
right to call oneself the Emperor of Moldavia, to perform one hundred
jumping jacks, or to sing the Marseillaise. The salient proprietary feature of
the future interest arises from mutual exclusivity and the way that one per-
son’s future interest rules out a contradictory one held by someone else, not
the right to exclude others from a resource. The shielding conception is
equally ill-suited to explaining future interests. A future interest itself cannot
be described as any kind of special normative domain or relationship in
which others must defer to the interest holders’ plans to use a resource. At
the margins, the law of waste may provide something like the nuisance-like
protection from interference central to the shielding conception, but this is
community property and in either a joint tenancy or a tenancy in common at the same
time.”).
78. Sandra H. Johnson et al., Property Law: Cases, Materials and Problems 141
(3d ed. 2006); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies
518 (3d ed. 2016).
79. Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Re-
source, 32 Envtl. L. 773, 775 (2002).
80. Cf. James C. Roberton, Recent Development, Abandonment of Mineral Rights, 21
Stan. L. Rev. 1227, 1228 (1969) (noting the “seldom-articulated but ancient policy disfavoring
voids or gaps in the chain of title to land”).
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surely tangential to the main story. The system of future interests—all those
rules about contingent remainders, executory interests, and the like—would
itself continue to play out just the way it does now if the law of waste were
abolished entirely.
3. Servitudes and Easements
Next, consider servitudes. I use the term broadly to refer to rights either
to use an asset belonging to another or to limit the way someone else can use
something that belongs to them. Suppose B receives a right from A, a neigh-
bor, to cross A’s land in order to reach a lake on the other side (an affirma-
tive easement). The right does not purport to prevent other neighbors from
receiving similar access rights of their own, so it isn’t exclusive in that sense.
Yet the principle of mutual exclusivity is at work because property law will
not recognize property rights held by others that contradict it. Imagine, for
instance, that at some point A has also attempted to give another neighbor,
C, a property entitlement—a conservation easement, let’s say—that gives C
the right that no one will cut across A’s land. If B holds a valid property
right, C does not, at least so far as it pertains to B. By contrast, if B’s right-
of-way were purely contractual and C indeed received the conservation ease-
ment, B’s right would be defeated by C’s property right. And if both B’s and
C’s rights were considered purely contractual rights, the only result that can
be predicted with confidence is litigation.
Once again, the various understandings of exclusivity described in Part I
have little to say about such arrangements. The Blackstonian conception
does not seem to leave room for easements and servitudes.81 The exclusion
conception faces similar difficulties. It is difficult to see how one person’s
right to use the property of another can itself be characterized as a right to
exclude or deny access. An affirmative easement is principally a matter of
eliminating A’s right to exclude B. In his defense of the exclusion conception,
Thomas Merrill argues that the right to exclude is still at work in such a
situation because other people are forbidden to interfere with B’s exercise of
her rights.82 But if the point of speaking of a right “to exclude” is to refer not
simply to any sort of negative right against others, but to a right whose
duties are defined in terms of duties defined in terms of boundary crossings,
generic rights against interference don’t qualify.83 Furthermore, even if a
right to be free from interference in the exercise of an easement were
counted as an instance of the right to exclude, the role of that protection is
clearly peripheral and secondary. The heart of the right-of-way is the simple
freedom to cross A’s land—the lifting of a prohibition so that B can do
81. See discussion supra Section I.A. This analysis points to the confusion in cases like
Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
which concluded that a nonexclusive licensee had no property interest without inquiring into
protection from others who might seek to exclude the licensee, id. at 1334.
82. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Va. L. Rev. 885,
972 (2000).
83. See supra Section I.A.
1188 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:1167
something that would otherwise be a trespass—rather any additional rights
against others that they not impede B in doing so. After all, there can be no
rights against interfering with a right-of-way unless there is a right-of-way in
the first place.
The shielding conception equally fails to capture the essence of such
rights. While the shielding conception accommodates the idea of protection
against interference, it goes beyond that, presupposing a domain of norma-
tive decisionmaking as the object of such protection. The foundation of the
shielding view is the ability to “set an agenda” for a resource, as Larissa Katz
puts it, which others must then respect.84 A mere right-of-way falls short of
this robust vision. Not only is the right to traverse a particular piece of land
fairly narrow, leaving little room for imagination and discretion, but the
right is itself likely to be qualified in terms of how it is exercised—what
speeds B may drive (if the easement even confers the right to drive), what
times of day, how frequently, and so forth.
Attempts to salvage either the exclusion or shielding conceptions in the
easement example by relying on protection against interference in the exer-
cise of the rights it confers are subject to two general objections. First, rights
against interfering with the exercise of other, primary rights are ubiquitous
and in no sense special to property. In various ways, for example, the right
to vote is protected against outside interference with its exercise, but that
hardly transforms it into a property right. Second, and conversely, property
rights are not always accompanied by rights against interference by others.85
In some circumstances, all that the law provides is a naked property right to
use property of another,86 without any further rights against others requir-
ing them to refrain from impeding the exercise of that freedom. For exam-
ple, O, a landowner, can convey a servitude to H entitling H to hunt or fish
on O’s land. Some courts have held that H acquires no rights against inter-
ference with the enjoyment of those rights, as by cutting down the trees in
which game live.87 In short, the mere fact that the right-of-way includes a
right that others not interfere with it is insufficient to show any meaningful
connection to exclusivity.
4. IP and Other Intangibles
The foregoing discussion of mortgages, future interests, and servitudes
may give the impression that the mutual exclusivity principle is somehow
special to property rights in land, or maybe physical objects. But it applies
84. See Katz, supra note 5, at 290.
85. This does not include background protections like criminal and tort prohibitions on
the infliction of physical harm, which are not themselves creations of property law and would
obtain even if the law of property vanished altogether.
86. A “privilege,” in Hohfeldian terminology. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Matera Inv’rs, Inc. v. Sunset Lake Fishing & Hunting Club, 696 F. Supp.
1510, 1515–17 (M.D. Ga. 1988); Mikesh v. Peters, 284 N.W.2d 215, 216–19 (Iowa 1979);
Gearns v. Baker [1875] 10 Ch D 355 at 355–57 (Eng.).
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with equal force to rights in intangible goods. This is true both for in-
tangibles like assignable contractual rights and for intellectual property. Mu-
tual exclusivity is a crucial part of what drives the classification of these
rights as property rights.
While the idea of property rights in intangible “things” has never been
free from controversy, the idea is generally accepted today, and indeed has
been for centuries.88 Consider property claims in legal relationships like
debts (known to specialists as “choses-in-action”) or in shares of corporate
stock. The role of mutual exclusivity is central to these. If A is owed a debt
and assigns it to B, then A cannot also assign the same debt to C. If A holds
50 percent stake in Acme Corp., then it is impossible for B to hold a 60
percent stake. The structure of property governs here and disallows mutually
exclusive claims. It is again difficult to see how either the exclusion or shield-
ing understandings fits in. The right to exclude doesn’t seem to have much
to do with these scenarios. What would it mean to trespass on a share of
stock? Neither an assignable debt nor a corporate share speaks in terms of
duties in any way analogous to a duty not to trespass. As for the shielding
conception, it is even more difficult to see how such entitlements involve an
interest protected from interference by others, analogous to, say, a farmer’s
interest in tilling the soil.
Mutual exclusivity is also an essential aspect of intellectual property
rights. Priority questions are a central part of both patent and trademark
law.89 Indeed, the recent change in priority rules for patents effected by the
88. See Stuart Banner, American Property: A History of How, Why, and What
We Own 7–10, 13 (2011) (discussing historical understanding of property in intangibles, such
as advowsons).
89. See Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really
Necessary?, 54 Hastings L.J. 1299, 1307–08 (2003); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopo-
lies, 48 Emory L.J. 367, 392 n.85 (1999); see also, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(4) (2012) (providing
that a trademark assignment is void against any subsequent purchaser for valuable considera-
tion without notice unless timely recorded—and, implicitly, that a subsequent assignment is
void when the first assignment has been recorded properly). It bears emphasis that mutual
exclusivity should not be confused with exclusive rights of use. Trademark rights, for instance,
generally confer the sole right to use a particular trademark in a given market, but mutual
exclusivity does not require this. Consider certification marks involving geographic origins.
Anyone who produces Roquefort cheese—that is, sheep’s milk blue-mold cheese produced in
Roquefort, France—is entitled to designate their product using a particular symbol, the word
“Roquefort.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5)(D); Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 198
F. Supp. 291, 293–94 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff’d, 303 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1962). Though a given
Roquefort producer does not have the sole right to use the mark, the right that the producer
holds to use it is still subject to the mutual exclusivity principle insofar as no other Roquefort
maker can acquire a trademark right that would prevent that use. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(2).
In this respect, it confers an in rem privilege. See Hohfeld, supra note 58, at 32–33; supra notes
58–59 and accompanying text.
This multiple-user paradigm is less common in trademark law than the grant of rights of
exclusive use, but that sort of exclusivity is qualified in any number of ways that mutual exclu-
sivity is not, and it is important to keep the distinction between the two in mind. A trademark
holder generally does not have rights against firms making unrelated products, for instance, or
against a competitor’s nominative uses. See, e.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software
Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 288 (3d Cir. 2001); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796,
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America Invents Act was heralded as the biggest change in American patent
law in at least half a century.90 And even in copyright law, where two differ-
ent people can have rights in the same intellectual good if they each inde-
pendently conceived of it and fixed it in tangible form,91 their rights in their
respective creations are still exclusive of the claims of others, including one
other.92 If Keats and Shelley by coincidence happen to write identical poems
and Tennyson then copies from Keats, Keats can recover from Tennyson for
copyright infringement but Shelley cannot.93 More importantly still, if Keats
transfers his copyright to Shelley, he cannot then transfer it to Tennyson, at
least without destroying or diminishing Shelley’s rights. Rights to control
the intangible goods of intellectual property law, whether inventions, crea-
tive works, or brands, are subject to the same mutual exclusivity principle
that governs entitlements in more traditional physical property assets.94
By contrast, the competing understandings of exclusivity we have seen
struggle with intellectual property. The exclusion conception misses some
important features of intellectual property rights. Under U.S. copyright law,
for instance, joint authors of a copyrighted work are generally treated as
tenants in common and are each entitled to use and license the work to
others without obtaining the consent of other cotenants.95 These are signifi-
cant rights and differ from the approach that some other countries have
adopted in their own copyright laws.96 The exclusion perspective implies that
the unilateral licensing policy of U.S. law results in weaker copyrights than
exist in some foreign systems, but that characterization is questionable.
While each copyright holder loses the ability to prevent the other from li-
censing the work, each also gains the right to license without the other’s
consent. Unless there is some reason to suppose that the power to license is
less important than the power to block licensing by someone else, it seems
like a wash analytically. And as a practical matter, the ability to license with-
out getting others to sign off may be more useful than the ability to block
800–02 (9th Cir. 2002). Mutual exclusivity, by contrast, is in principle present even for goods
in the public domain—that is, when a good is part of an open-access commons.
90. See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America In-
vents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 517, 519 (2013).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
92. Id. § 106.
93. In principle, in fact, if Shelley makes copies from Keats’s copies, Shelley still commits
infringement, even though Shelley also independently creates the same work.
94. See Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 109. Indeed, a principal criticism of intellectual
property rights is that they unnecessarily create what might be described as rivalrous rights in
non-rivalrous goods. See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Comedy of the Market, 30 Colum. J.L. &
Arts 453, 455 (2007).
95. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976). An exclusive license may not be granted
without the consent of copyright co-owners. See Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir.
2007).
96. See William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 383,
427 (2000) (observing that in the United Kingdom, one joint author “may not license the
work or sue without the other’s permission”).
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licenses by others. A similar problem concerns conflicts between licensees.
Imagine, for instance, that a patent holder grants a nonexclusive license to
one manufacturer to produce a patented invention and later attempts to
grant an exclusive license to a second manufacturer. If the second grant is
invalid because of the first, it is the first that can lay a credible claim to being
some kind of property right. Yet it is only the second grant—the purport-
edly exclusive license—that entails any sort of right to exclude.97
The shielding conception faces still more serious difficulties in account-
ing for intellectual property. The goods to which intellectual property rights
attach are said to be nonrivalrous: one person’s use or consumption of a
particular IP good doesn’t diminish the ability of others to do the same.98
So, for instance, the fact that Wolfgang is singing a particular song doesn’t
prevent Ludwig from singing it too. And if a given person’s interest in using
an invention or creative work does not interfere with another’s ability to do
so, the ordinary theory of property as protection from interference does not,
on its face, come into play.99
B. The Reality of Property: Trespass Versus Title
Beyond the ins and outs of doctrine governing these areas of property
law, the centrality of the mutual exclusivity principle can be seen by looking
at property more widely. Much of the academic and theoretical literature on
property is preoccupied with defining the proper limits of the prerogatives
of property owners. To what extent should the owner of a given thing be
able to deny others access to it?100 How strong should the remedies for unau-
thorized access be?101 What protection, if any, should an owner be given
97. It is conceivable that the nonexclusive licensee would be able to prevent an entity that
had no license at all from practicing the patent, but the claim that the licensee’s right is prop-
erty-like does not depend on the existence of rights against the unlicensed.
98. See Nachbar, supra note 94, at 454.
99. This isn’t to say that shielding theorists deny any basis for intellectual property
rights, only that the basic conception of property as protection from interference in using
something cannot be carried over without substantial modification. See Larissa Katz, A Pow-
ers-Based Approach to the Protection of Ideas, 23 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 687, 720 (2006)
(discussing intentional creation of noninterference duty to protect intellectual property); cf.
Eric R. Claeys, On Cowbells in Rock Anthems (and Property in IP): A Review of Justifying
Intellectual Property, 49 San Diego L. Rev. 1033, 1044–45 (2012) (applying labor theory to
intellectual property); Mossoff, supra note 5, at 376 (advancing an “integrated theory of prop-
erty” to modernize the concept of property).
100. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1090, 1092–93, 1099–113
(2011); Eduardo Moise´s Pen˜alver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1095,
1097–98 (2007); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 711–13, 748 (1986); Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and
Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 107, 111–12 (2013); Joseph
William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1283, 1303, 1466 (1996).
101. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Lia-
bility Rules, and Beyond, 106 Yale L.J. 703, 705 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic
Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027, 1027
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against governmental restrictions on property?102 In a broad sense, we can
think of these as questions about the rightful scope of trespassory protec-
tion. The exclusion and shielding conceptions plug into that matrix of issues
quite neatly, particularly as ways of understanding ownership.
But a large part of the life of property law is dominated not by concerns
of that sort but by a distinct, if not wholly separate, set of issues. Rather than
trespass, these might broadly be considered issues of title.103 On this view,
property law is centrally about title investigations, patent searches, registra-
tion, recordation, financing statements, bona fide purchaser and negotiabil-
ity rules, adverse possession, first possession, finders, and the powers of
bailees—issues having to do with the creation, transfer, and division of
rights in assets.104 The questions here are less about the limits of property
holders’ rights against outsiders than about who the rightful property holder
is.
This cluster of problems is fundamental to the role property plays. Un-
like rights of personal security—the right not to be punched in the nose, for
instance—rights in external objects raise questions not only about the scope
of the right against the wider world but also about the identity of the right
holder. There certainly are questions in tort law about whether a particular
injury constitutes a violation of the injured person’s legal rights, but there is
usually no dispute about whose rights have been violated if it is agreed that a
violation has indeed occurred.105 If my negligent act causes A to suffer a
broken arm, it is highly unlikely the law will treat G, rather than A, as the
(1995); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 79
(2002); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1399, 1401 (2005); Mark A.
Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 Tex. L.
Rev. 783, 832–33 (2007).
102. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Emi-
nent Domain 263–82 (1985); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American
Property Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 745, 746 (2009); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1412, 1430–31 (2006); Brian Angelo Lee, Just
Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in Eminent Domain, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 593,
595 (2013); David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1773, 1776 (2013).
103. Interestingly, these terms may, in some sense, misdescribe the divide. Historically,
remedies like trespass and ejectment morphed from mechanisms to repel intruders and hold-
overs into vehicles for determining title to land. See 7 William Holdsworth, A History of
English Law 4–23 (2d ed. 1937). A similar story can be told about trover and conversion as
methods to determine title to chattels. See id. at 402–47.
104. See, e.g., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer
of Property, 13 J. Legal Stud. 299 (1984).
105. Cf. Penner, supra note 5, at 28. This should not be confused with the more philo-
sophical question, famously confronted in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.
1928), whether an actor owes a duty to one person not to injure that person by virtue of
conduct that unreasonably risks injury only to someone else. Whatever other disagreements
there may be about Palsgraf, no one supposes that the passenger whose package was dislodged
should have been able to sue the railroad for damages over the injuries sustained by Mrs.
Palsgraf.
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victim.106 The same cannot be said for property. Because there is no intrinsic
connection between individual persons and external things—that is what
makes them “external” in the first place—property law is in some sense en-
gaged in a highly artificial enterprise.107 It seeks to attach things to people, so
to speak, not physically but as a matter of abstract legal relationship, thereby
making those things a feature or “property” of those to whom they are con-
nected.108 That additional task is a conceptual hallmark of property, and the
mutual exclusivity principle is the basic ground rule dictating the way it is
carried out.
This theoretical observation packs a potent practical punch. Mutual ex-
clusivity is an essential part of the everyday life of property in the sense that
it concerns a major part of what lawyers actually do. While litigation about
the relative strength of an owner’s rights against strangers or the government
is certainly important, the typical working of property law is often a matter
of boundary and title questions—rather than a matter of the implications
that general concept of ownership holds when it comes to determining what
rights an owner may assert against outsiders. This is as true for modern
types of property as it is for old-fashioned land law. Quite apart from prior-
ity disputes, for instance, problems tracing chains of title for IP rights are a
significant issue for lawyers involved in the context of both IP transactional
work and of corporate mergers and acquisitions, as transfers of IP rights are
often improperly executed or recorded.109
It isn’t simply that these sorts of questions absorb a major part of peo-
ple’s energy and time, moreover. They are essential to the functions property
106. Tort law sometimes allows recovery by those who suffer injuries by virtue of harm
inflicted upon a primary victim, as with loss of consortium or pain and suffering occasioned
by having been the witness to someone else’s physical injury, though these situations are not
the most common tort paradigm. Cf. S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531,
533 (1918) (Holmes, J.) (“The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not
to go beyond the first step.”). Even when recovery is allowed for derivative injuries, it is usually
confined to someone having a fairly close relationship to the person who has been harmed,
such as a spouse or other family member. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 835 (Cal.
1989). In some, and perhaps many, instances of derivative injury, moreover, recovery may also
be thought of as a way of indirectly vindicating the interests of the primary victim, and to the
extent that is so, there isn’t really any disconnect at all between the person injured and the
person whose rights have been violated. It is true that the right to sue in tort for an injury that
has been inflicted often can be assigned, but that simply reflects the fact that the right to sue
can itself be treated as an alienable property asset. Cf. James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution,
101 Calif. L. Rev. 277, 303–04 (2013).
107. See Penner, supra note 5, at 111–12.
108. See Stern, supra note 106, at 294 (“Property law affixes a sort of invisible tag to every
object in the world, naming the person authorized to decide how to use the object.”).
109. See Steve Behnken, Sale of a Business: The Forgotten Intangible Assets, 22 DCBA
Brief, May 2010, at 28, 28–29 (“All too often a company believes it has clear title to an asset,
only to find out that its predecessor failed to obtain an assignment or failed to properly record
title . . . . [A thorough examination of titling documents, including any recorded claims,] is
particularly important with regard to copyrights and patents.”).
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law serves and the way it works. Titling systems are rightly considered fun-
damental to the institutions of modern economic life.110 Indeed, one influ-
ential thesis holds that they are key to alleviating poverty in the developing
world.111 At the opposite end of the spectrum, failure to maintain accurate
accounts of claims on assets is cited as an important cause of the global
financial crisis.112 And in a still different context, inventing a method to co-
ordinate claims so as to avoid what is termed the “double spending” prob-
lem lies at the heart of potentially transformative financial innovations like
Bitcoin.113
Single-minded preoccupation with trespassory questions, important
though they are, threatens to distort our understanding of property by
neglecting the crucial and conceptually distinct enterprise of determining
title, a problem directly linked to the mutual exclusivity principle. The titling
issue isn’t merely downplayed; often it is viewed as simply another way of
describing trespass issues, rather than a separate conceptual dimension of
property.114 To be sure, the line between the two types of problems isn’t
airtight. In many cases, it’s at least possible to redescribe a titling problem as
a trespass issue, since title to assets ultimately bears upon who is a trespasser
and who is not. But whatever room there may be for recharacterization at
the margins, there is generally an obvious difference between uncertainty
about just how big the proverbial bundle of rights is and uncertainty about
who holds the bundle.115 Two rival claimants to a resource, whether a piece
of land or a patent, may well agree on whether a particular act would consti-
tute a wrongful invasion, once it is determined whom the resource belongs
to, but disagree entirely about whose resource it is. And the rules, facts, and
110. See Benito Arrun˜ada, Institutional Foundations of Impersonal Exchange:
Theory and Policy of Contractual Registries 7 (2012).
111. See Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in
the West and Fails Everywhere Else (2000); see also Edward Robbins, Formalisation of
Land and Housing Tenure to Empower the Poor: Simple Nostrum or Complex Challenge?, in
Rights and Legal Empowerment in Eradicating Poverty 175, 175–76 (Dan Banik ed.,
2008).
112. See Peterson, supra note 72, at 126.
113. See Kelsey L. Penrose, Banking on Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering and
Money Transmitter Laws, 18 N.C. Banking Inst. 529, 532–33 (2014). Indeed, much of what
makes Bitcoin so innovative is its decentralized mechanism to resolve conflicting claims. See
Jerry Brito et al., Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and
Gambling, 16 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 144, 149 (2014).
114. A thoughtful exception acknowledging the difference is Emily Sherwin, Two- and
Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 1075, 1076 (1997). I do not mean to
imply, however, that title problems themselves have escaped scholarly attention. See, e.g.,
Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1122, 1126–27 (1985); Robbins, supra note 111. Rather, the significance of titling to both
general mechanics and the overall concept of property law has been insufficiently appreciated.
Cf. Matthew Baker et al., Optimal Title Search, 31 J. Legal Stud. 139, 139 (2002) (“An often
neglected but nonetheless important aspect of market exchange is the question of whether the
seller of a good is the true owner.”).
115. The difference has important practical consequences, which are explored in Part III.
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legal proceedings used to determine what counts as a trespass or patent in-
fringement will often be very different from those used to determine who
owns the land or holds the patent.116
Problems related to title have certainly received thoughtful, if sporadic
attention,117 but neither the nature of the basic title concept nor its true
significance to property as a legal institution are widely appreciated in the
academic literature. Titling problems are in many ways more technical than
trespassory ones and have less obvious connections to public law-ish themes
like the strength of state power, the scope of public rights, and the distribu-
tion of wealth.118 This may help account for some of the legal academy’s
emphasis on the trespassory side of property. The result, at any rate, is an
incomplete and somewhat skewed conception of what drives property law.
Seeing property as a matter of “exclusive rights” in the sense that it precludes
mutually exclusive entitlements recognizes an essential aspect of its formal
structure and a vital part of how property works as a practical institution.
C. Objections
At this point, it is useful to pause to consider a few objections that
might be lodged against the general argument advanced thus far. The first
has to do with the idea of “relative title” in Anglo-American property law,
which a skeptic might claim is inconsistent with the mutual exclusivity prin-
ciple. In the simplest terms, it is usually wrong for a stranger to steal from a
thief, and, more generally, a court whose jurisdiction is in personam is only
authorized to decide which of the parties before it has the superior claim to
a particular thing, leaving open the possibility someone else has a still
116. A derivation or interference proceeding in patent law, for instance, is distinct from a
suit for patent infringement. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2012) (describing derivation pro-
ceedings as determining who, among multiple inventors claiming the same invention, is enti-
tled to apply for a patent on the invention), with id. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports
into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes
the patent.”).
117. See, e.g., Benito Arrun˜ada, Institutional Support of the Firm: A Theory of Business
Registries, 2 J. Legal Analysis 525, 526 (2010); Baird & Jackson, supra note 104; Abraham Bell
& Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Information, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 237 (2016);
Thomas J. Miceli et al., Title Systems and Land Values, 45 J.L. & Econ. 565 (2002); Carol M.
Rose, What Government Can Do for Property (and Vice Versa), in The Fundamental Interre-
lationships Between Government and Property 209, 213 (Nicholas Mercuro & Warren J.
Samuels eds., 1999); Rose, supra note 62.
118. There is obviously an important distributive dimension to the problem of titling in
its broadest sense. In this respect, Laura Underkuffler has perhaps gone the furthest in bring-
ing out the mutually exclusive quality of property in her writings about the conflicts and
trade-offs property presents, at least for “physical, finite, nonsharable resources.” See Laura S.
Underkuffler, Property and Change: The Constitutional Conundrum, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 2015, 2029
(2013); see also Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Response, Property: A Special Right, 71 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1033, 1038 (1996) (“Property involves allocation; with regard to property, the
giving to one person necessarily denies or takes from another.”).
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stronger claim.119 In contrast to the conception of property in Roman law
and the modern legal systems derived from it in continental Europe, the
view of property taken by the English common law system lacks true in rem
absoluteness.120 How can there be mutual exclusivity if the thief and the true
owner both have rights in the asset?
Very easily. Even if the legal protection enjoyed by a thief or in per-
sonam–judgment holder is viewed as a true property right, the mutual ex-
clusivity principle has ample room to operate.121 The conceptual
organization of property is still centered on the “true owner,” the person
whose claims are superior to those of the thief or other lesser claimant, even
if no proceeding is provided in which the identity of the true owner can be
conclusively established once and for all. So long as there is still thought to
be a true owner (or other property holder) around whom all other claims
are oriented, mutual exclusivity remains.122 A hierarchical, nested structure
of rights (A defeats B and C; B defeats C) is no less compatible with the
mutual exclusivity principle than a binary structure (A defeats B and C; B
and C are of equal rank). Either way, the position of the true owner is the
same.123
119. See David Fox, Relativity of Title at Law and in Equity, 65 Cambridge L.J. 330,
336–38 (2006).
120. See id. at 334–36.
121. These doctrines can be conceptually harmonized with property law in a number of
ways other than as property rights: as a general rule, grounded in the need to avoid vigilan-
tism, against dispossessing others that nevertheless denies them any true primary rights, or as
a limitation on standing to raise the rights of third parties.
122. In a less well-known portion of his essay on the concept of ownership (usually cited
for its catalog of the “incidents” of ownership), Honore´ distinguishes between what he calls
unititular and multititular systems, the latter being those in which independent titles can be
formed without being hived off from some previous chain of title, as with adverse possession.
See A.M. Honore´, Ownership, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 107, 138–41 (A.G. Guest
ed., 1961). Even in such a system, however, there must be “rules for enabling the holders of
titles to recover possession and for regulating priorities between the holders of competing
titles.” Id. at 140. Why must there be such rules? Honore´ does not say, taking it as self-evident,
but the reason is mutual exclusivity. He then points out that it is not necessary to have an in
rem-type proceeding because the holder of “the best title” can always make use of the remedies
for those with “a title.” Id. at 140–41. Most importantly, for these purposes, he observes that
“of course, if priorities are regulated someone must have top priority.” Id. at 141.
123. In this sense, the otherwise-formidable J.W. Harris has it backwards. In explaining
why relativity of title does not undermine the idea of ownership, he argues that relativity of
title in effect only concerns the ownership of rights, rather than ownership of things them-
selves. See Harris, supra note 5, at 81. His argument is that the difference between the true
and provisional (i.e., false) owner lies in the circumstances in which they may claim owner-
ship, not the legal consequences of ownership when it can be claimed, and that therefore the
concept of ownership is unaffected by introduction of relative title. This misses the point of
relativity. It is not the similarity between the provisional and the true owner but the difference
that accounts for property’s distinct form. It would not transform the concept of property to
confer greater rights on the true owner of a thing than on a merely provisional one; it would
transform property entirely to abolish the very concept of the true owner, so that every holder
of rights in property was a free agent and no ordering system to determine whose claims defeat
whose.
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A second objection comes from the opposite direction. Rather than dis-
puting that mutual exclusivity governs property entitlements, a skeptic
might argue that all entitlements are subject to the mutual exclusivity princi-
ple because any conflicts between rights must eventually be resolved. Yes, a
person might enter into conflicting contracts, but at the end of the day, only
one of them will get specific performance; contradictory rights will have to
be reconciled when the conflict becomes real.124 Indeed, a particularly ambi-
tious critic in this vein might argue that noncontradiction is a hallmark of
any legal system and is associated with the idea of the rule of law.125 That’s
why we have rules to resolve conflicts between statutes—a later statute that
clearly contradicts an earlier one repeals the earlier one, for instance.126
This argument misunderstands how mutual exclusivity works. For a
start, the mutual exclusivity principle describes the conceptual structure of
property entitlements, not the form of remedy provided when a violation
occurs. Mutual exclusivity does not mean property entails a right to injunc-
tions or other remedies classified as “property-rule” protection within the
well-known Calabresi-Melamed framework.127 Property rights would still be
governed by the mutual exclusivity principle—there could not be two inde-
pendent ownerships of the same asset—in a world in which everyone was
perfectly law-abiding and incapable of making a legal error.128 In such a
world, the owner of an asset who sold it to one person would simply decline
to sell to a subsequent purchaser. No remedy of any kind would be needed,
but mutual exclusivity would remain as a fundamental characteristic of the
concept of property just the same.
What is critical to understand is that when a person enters into conflict-
ing contracts, both counterparties are entitled to complete remedies, even if
this means at least one of them must receive substitutionary rather than
specific relief (money damages rather than specific performance). The fact
that remedies are provided to both parties testifies to the view that both hold
underlying substantive rights. By contrast, when one person purports to
124. Cf. Claire Oakes Finkelstein, Introduction to the Symposium on Conflicts of Rights, 7
Legal Theory 235, 235 (2001) (“[C]ontemporary rights theorists have generally assumed that
rights cannot conflict.”); Phillip Montague, When Rights Conflict, 7 Legal Theory 257,
275–77 (2001) (discussing view in which conflict among rights exists at a “prima facie” level
but may be resolved at an “all-things-considered” level).
125. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 65–70 (rev. ed. 1969); see also Steiner,
supra note 62, at 767–68.
126. E.g., Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (“[W]here provisions in the
two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an
implied repeal of the earlier one . . . .”).
127. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 29, at 1127; see also supra note 29 and accompany-
ing text.
128. Conversely, a grant of injunctive relief does not imply that the mutual exclusivity
principle is at work. In a title dispute, a court might grant both contenders the injunctions
they seek, such that each was excluded from the property by the other. Nevertheless, there is a
strong connection between injunctive relief and mutual exclusivity since it is impossible both
to issue an injunction, vindicating one side’s claim to exclude, and not to issue it, vindicating
the other’s freedom to use.
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convey the same property to two different people, only one of those recipi-
ents will receive any property rights as a result. Often this fact is obscured
because there will be a parallel contractual relationship operating alongside.
But if there is no contractual arrangement to fall back on, as when the at-
tempted conveyances are gifts, the disappointed party doesn’t just fail to get
title to the property. The disappointed party doesn’t get anything else ei-
ther—no damages, no nothing—because there are no property rights for
the party to receive that would give rise to a claim against anyone else.129
Finally, a critic who accepted that mutual exclusivity is a distinctive fea-
ture of the concept of property might nevertheless dispute that mutual ex-
clusivity tells us anything we didn’t already know, viewing it as simply an
automatic consequence of more basic features of property that are well un-
derstood. For example, one might say that if ownership of Blackacre confers
rights against the whole world, it seems obvious that one person’s owner-
ship would preclude another’s: What good is a right that binds everybody if
each person bound by it might also hold some other right unbinding them?
There is certainly something to this. Property is a form of authority,130
and it seems inherent in the notion of authority itself that it precludes con-
trary authority.131 But matters aren’t so simple. Consider an analogy to judi-
cial jurisdiction, the authority of a court to resolve a dispute between two
adverse parties. For the most part, these grants of power do overlap. Courts
with exclusive jurisdiction are rare; concurrency is the rule.132 The same dis-
pute can be brought in the courts of two different U.S. states or two differ-
ent nations, which can each produce their own potentially contradictory
judgments. Not surprisingly, there is a strong impulse to resolve the conflict
between these dueling resolutions, which is why preclusion and judgment-
recognition rules have been developed.133 But there is much that the rules do
not cover even when it comes to final judgments, and they generally do
nothing to restrict each court’s initial authority to adjudicate the dispute.134
Overlap is a basic feature of the system, and conflict is the obvious result.
129. The point still stands in the more complex situation where the disappointed party
receives a subordinate, contingent claim to the property.
130. Alchian, supra note 6.
131. See Sarah Worthington, Equity 3–5 (2d ed. 2006) (“Imagine what would happen
if our five-year-olds were to have two sets of umpires monitoring their game, one applying red
rules and red practices and delivering red responses to the events, the other applying green
rules and green practices and delivering green responses to the events. The game would de-
scend into chaos.”).
132. Indeed, one of the few areas it is common is jurisdiction to determine title to prop-
erty. See Stern, supra note 63, at 120–23, 166–68 (describing unusual jurisdictional exclusivity
rules for property and arguing for a connection based on the conceptual structure of
property).
133. See generally George Rutherglen & James Y. Stern, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, in Foreign Court Judgments and the United States
Legal System 13 (Paul B. Stephan ed., 2014).
134. See id.
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The point is that property could conceivably be structured like this, with
concurrent, equally valid authority over the same asset. But it isn’t.
Even more importantly, as we have seen, not all property rights do im-
pose duties on everyone else. Mutual exclusivity helps us see how rights that
impose duties on only a single person could still be “good against the
world,” as in the case of a negative easement.135 So even if it were inevitable
that rights imposing duties on the whole world negate anyone else in the
world’s contradictory rights, that only accounts for part of property law.
Some entitlements impose narrower duties or no duties at all, and when
they are thought of as property, they are subjected to the mutual exclusivity
principle.
A final variation on this line of argument focuses more on the subject
matter of property law than the form of property entitlements: Isn’t mutual
exclusivity simply a reflection of the fact that property is about rights in
scarce or rivalrous goods? A good is rivalrous when consumption by one
person and consumption by another are mutually exclusive as a matter of
practical fact (two people cannot eat the same apple, for instance), and it
stands to reason that rights in such mutually exclusive resources are them-
selves mutually exclusive of one another.
But few if any propertizable assets are perfectly rivalrous in this way,
and some goods—such as ideas protected by IP law—are thought to be basi-
cally nonrivalrous. Conversely, there are plenty of rights involving undenia-
bly rivalrous goods that are not subjected to the mutual exclusivity principle.
Two people cannot eat the same apple, but two people can enter separate
contracts purporting to give them the right to eat it. Entitlements structured
on the property model can be used for nonrivalrous goods and entitlements
structured on the contractual model can be used for rivalrous ones. The
form of the right is not dictated by the nature of the asset it concerns.
III. Understanding Property
Why does all this matter? To be sure, the basic architecture of an institu-
tion as fundamental to social existence as property might be thought to be
intrinsically interesting, at least to scholars of law. But the importance of
understanding the structure of property is much more than a matter of
purely academic curiosity. As discussed, mutual exclusivity helps us to rec-
ognize how titling problems differ in kind from trespassory ones and, in
doing so, it strongly implies that renewed attention should be given to the
titling side of the equation.
The remainder of this Part will explore some additional implications of
the general argument advanced in this Article. It will first show how mutual
exclusivity helps explain a number of significant doctrinal and institutional
features of property law. It will then suggest some ways in which the mutual
exclusivity principle amends theoretical accounts of property focused on in-
formation costs.
135. And this is so even if the right does not bind successors in interest.
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A. Identifying Property
We have already seen how the mutual exclusivity principle provides one
of the critical tests to differentiate between different forms of legal right.
Mutual exclusivity—in contrast to other exclusivity-based understandings of
property—tells us what is property-like about a mortgage and a chose-in-
action and what distinguishes a contract right involving a particular asset
from a true property entitlement in it. This isn’t just about taxonomy for its
own sake. A variety of different legal fields—including bankruptcy law,136 tax
law,137 conflict of laws,138 and constitutional law139—apply special rules to
“property,” making it important to be able to identify what does and does
not count as property.140 While the mutual exclusivity principle does not
provide a comprehensive definition of property, it helps make clear what is
at stake in these determinations. To the extent, for instance, that priority in
bankruptcy law depends on whether a person holds a right of property, it is
important to realize that priority itself—the practical face of the mutual ex-
clusivity principle—lies at the heart of the concept of property.141 To deter-
mine whether a particular claim has priority by asking whether it is a
property entitlement can leave a court chasing its own tail.142
Properly understanding the structure of property can also affect how
doctrines applicable to property operate. In the context of Takings Clause
doctrine, for instance, the Supreme Court has given much greater protection
against diminutions of property owners’ rights to exclude others than
against diminutions of their rights to use their property. At least where land
is concerned, any permanent abridgement of the right to exclude is said to
be an automatic taking, even in the case of the most “minute” invasions.143
By contrast, regulations that restrict the way property can be used are only
treated as per se takings if they deny “all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of land.”144 Takings protection for the right to exclude is hair-trigger
sensitive while protection for the right to use property is anything but.
136. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012).
137. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 64, 6321 (2012).
138. See Stern, supra note 63, at 120–23.
139. See generally Merrill, supra note 82.
140. See Stern, supra note 106, at 279 n.8 (giving further examples).
141. Cf. Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy as Property Law, in Research Handbook on the
Economics of Property Law 206, 206 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011)
(“There is exactly one function bankruptcy law must serve. It must govern mutually insup-
portable obligations. . . . [B]ankruptcy law is property law.”).
142. Cf. In re Mississippi Valley Livestock, Inc., 745 F.3d 299 (7th Cir. 2014).
143. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); see also Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435–40 (1982) (holding that allowing a cable
company to install a wire on the outside of an apartment building was a per se taking).
144. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. Loretto remarked that loss of the right to exclude affects the
ability to use property as well, 458 U.S. at 436, though as Loretto itself demonstrates, this is
hardly always true in any meaningful sense. It is hard to see much additional injury in terms of
lost use of the portion of space taken up by the cable television wires and equipment, which all
told amounted to slightly more than one and one-half cubic feet. Id. at 438 n.16.
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What accounts for the difference? Primarily, it seems to reside in the
Supreme Court’s conviction that the right to exclude is among the “most
treasured strands”145 and “most essential sticks”146 in a property owner’s
bundle of rights, and indeed the “hallmark of a protected property inter-
est.”147 But while an owner’s right to prevent use by others is doubtless an
important aspect of private property, so too is an owner’s right to use what
her or she owns, and it is a mistake to conclude that curtailing the right to
exclude comes closer to the heart of property than a use restriction.148 Al-
though it is conceivable that some degree of differential treatment might be
justified on prudential grounds,149 the idea that exclusion is “essential” to
property law in a way that the ability to use property isn’t misunderstands
the source of property’s exclusive foundation.
And recognizing the mutual exclusivity principle can also help draw
connections across law, helping to reveal the patterns that run through dif-
ferent fields. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, for example, have
powerfully argued that the critical function of organizational law lies in “as-
set partitioning.”150 Devices like the corporate form allow certain assets asso-
ciated with a firm’s activities to be protected from the creditors of the firm’s
shareholders, thereby benefitting the firm’s creditors. And for entities en-
dowed with “limited liability,” other assets belonging to individual share-
holders are protected from firm creditors. Given this, Hansmann and
Kraakman conclude, “At its essential core, organizational law is property
145. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.
146. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
147. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999).
148. Indeed, the position cannot be taken entirely seriously, given the commitment to
upholding antidiscrimination provisions. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
82–84 (1980); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (alterna-
tive holding) (rejecting such arguments out of hand). Loretto sought to distinguish Pruneyard
on the ground that it involved a temporary, rather than a permanent, invasion. Loretto, 458
U.S. at 435 n.12. This is quite artificial. Any human occupation is likely to be temporary since
individual people are unlikely to want to remain in the same location forever. Although the
acts of occupation were temporary, the loss of the right to prevent such occupation was effec-
tively permanent. So while any given occupant can be expected eventually to vacate the prop-
erty, there is no reason to suppose either that person or someone else won’t return to occupy
it later.
149. Even small curtailments of the right to exclude can interfere substantially with a wide
range of activities, particularly those involving personal privacy, in a way that may not be true
for rights of use. Restrictions on the right to use property in certain defined ways will generally
leave many other alternatives open. If an owner cannot use property as a gas station, she may
still be able to use it as an apartment building. If an owner must allow someone else access to
the interior of her factory or her home, by contrast, informational privacy and personal secur-
ity are substantially diminished, and a large set of likely uses is affected. A rough categorical
generalization along these lines, combined with a preference for relatively clear-cut doctrinal
rules, might conceivably support some difference in treatment between loss of the right to
exclude others from property and loss of the right to use property.
150. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110
Yale L.J. 387, 440 (2000).
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law, not contract law.”151 Just so—and the reason is mutual exclusivity. Intu-
itively, Hansmann and Kraakman recognize that a system of entitlements
establishing priorities between competing claims is the hallmark of the
property form. Their insight is that primitive notions about the corporation
as property turns out to have substantial analytic truth to it.
This isn’t to say corporate law as a field doesn’t have contractarian
dimensions. It is a mix of many different legal building blocks.152 But a spe-
cial contribution of corporate law lies in establishing the priority of certain
claimants to a separately identified set of resources. Once it is understood
that property is about the allocation of a finite set of rights in a defined
subject matter so that one person’s valid entitlement defeats the competing
claims of others, it is possible to see how the property concept is used to
construct more sophisticated legal institutions. This in turn makes it possi-
ble to draw upon insights developed in the context of one property problem
in order to understand another. Insofar as corporate law is about asset parti-
tioning, for instance, the extensive body of writing on the foundations of
secured transactions law can shed light on the ways in which corporate law
does or does not serve a valuable social purpose.153 At the most general level,
we might hypothesize that the connection between security interests and the
structure of property suggested by the mutual exclusivity principle under-
scores the driving concern of property law to provide some form of security,
helping bring in philosophical as well as efficiency-based accounts of
property.154
151. Id.
152. See Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of
Contracts, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 715, 717–18 (2013). On the long-standing debate over whether a
corporation should be regarded as a “nexus of contracts,” see, for example, Melvin A. Eisen-
berg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the
Firm, 24 J. Corp. L. 819 (1998).
153. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L.J. 857, 859 (1996); Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt
Efficient?, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1117 (2002); Jackson & Kronman, supra note 73; Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1887, 1892 (1994); Ronald J. Mann, Explain-
ing the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 628 (1997); Steven L. Schwarcz, The
Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 Duke L.J. 425, 425–27 (1997);
Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 1051, 1060 (1984);
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (1986); see
also Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958).
154. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 70 (Richard Hildreth
trans., Oceana Publ’ns 1975) (1802); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1218
(1967); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 959 (1982) (de-
veloping a Hegel-inspired view of property in objects that are “part of the way we constitute
ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world”).
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B. Mechanics and Doctrine
The impact of the mutual exclusivity principle on property law can be
seen in a number of recurring doctrinal and institutional features of
property.
1. Possession, Delivery, and Certification
One clear example of how mutual exclusivity shapes the way property
law plays out is the extensive use property law makes of “possession” as a
basis of entitlement, ranging from the classification of security interests to
rules for the original acquisition of property.155 A number of attempts to
explain the significance of possession-based rules have argued such rules are
adopted because they tend to promote the efficient use of resources.156 In
Pierson v. Post, for example, the famous fox-hunting case studied in many
first-year property classes, the dispute centered on whether “hot pursuit”
was enough to establish a claim to a wild animal or whether instead it was
necessary actually to capture the animal being pursued.157 The majority in
Pierson opted for capture, a result typically justified on the ground that, in
addition to being less ambiguous than a hot-pursuit rule, insisting on cap-
ture rewards actual success in completing the chase.158
Focusing on mutual exclusivity, however, suggests a different set of rea-
sons to look to possession. Physical possession tends to identify a person or
group exclusively—that is, in a way that precludes simultaneous possession
by rival claimants—and it thereby sets the stage for the award of mutually
exclusive rights.159 Whatever other benefits follow from possession-based
rules, an important but easily overlooked advantage is that they generate
unique, noncontradictory answers of the form property law requires (and
which the efficiency arguments more commonly advanced presuppose).
155. See D. Benjamin Barros, The Biology of Possession, 20 Widener L.J. 291, 292 (2011);
Daniel Fitzpatrick & Susana Barnes, Rules of Possession Revisited: Property and the Problem of
Social Order, 39 Law & Soc. Inquiry 127, 129 (2014); James Gordley & Ugo Mattei, Protecting
Possession, 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 293, 293 (1996); Odelia Minnes, Redefining Possessory Liens in
Bankruptcy: Property, Contract, and What It All Means, 11 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 75, 76–77
(2012); Arun S. Subramanian, Assessing the Rights of IRU Holders in Uncertain Times, 103
Colum. L. Rev. 2094, 2103–04 (2003). See generally Frederick Pollock & Robert Samuel
Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law 1 (photo. reprint 1985) (1888)
(“Possession is a term of common occurrence and no mean significance in the law.”).
156. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 16; see also Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and
the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. & Econ. 393, 399–403 (1995) (suggesting the virtue of declaring
a clear winner and thereby avoiding wasteful competition); Rose, supra note 16, at 75–82
(describing notice function).
157. 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
158. See Josh Blackman, OutFoxed Pierson v. Post and the Natural Law, 51 Am. J. Legal
Hist. 417, 457–59 (2011); Andrea McDowell, Legal Fictions in Pierson v. Post, 105 Mich. L.
Rev. 735, 736–37 (2007).
159. The use of first possession rules, moreover, makes even clearer the importance of
priority by using an absolute ordinal to mediate between successive possessors.
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While commentators have certainly echoed the Pierson court’s idea that pos-
session helps establish clear titles to individual resources, their accounts tend
to focus on the rule-like or intuitive character of possession rules—that is, to
the ways possession-based rules are relatively easy to administer—rather
than on the zero-sum quality of possession.160
This isn’t simply an observation about doctrines formally denominated
as possession rules. For example, under traditional doctrine a gift is incom-
plete until “delivery,” which makes it much harder for someone to make a
gift of the same physical object to two different people.161 Having delivered it
once, nothing is left to deliver to someone else. Something similar might be
said about the concept of “seisin,” so important in the medieval develop-
ment of property law.162 Like the idea of possession at issue in Pierson v.
Post, these devices ensure that the quantum of property rights in circulation
remains keyed to the quantum of property.
It is also worth noting that when possession of the property itself isn’t
feasible, as with intangible goods, property rights may be represented by
physical tokens, ranging from stock certificates to membership cards to
number slips at the deli counter.163 The use of paper records has been said to
have the benefit of enabling more complex forms of property rights, since
the alternative of using physical possession as evidence of right holding
doesn’t easily accommodate arrangements in which rights in an asset are
divided.164 While this is undoubtedly true in many contexts, it isn’t docu-
mentation alone that matters. The system of stockholding wouldn’t work if a
company with a fixed limit of 100,000 shares of stock circulated an indefinite
number of stock certificates. Physical embodiments work only when it is
understood that their number must be pegged to the number of property
rights at issue—one right, one embodiment. Only when this is the case are
they effective because only when this is the case do they subject legal rights
to the mutual exclusivity principle.
2. Recording and Registration
Mutual exclusivity helps explain the heavy reliance on recording and
registration devices across the range of property situations, including real
160. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 16, at 94; Rose, supra note 16, at 76–77.
161. See Chad A. McGowan, Special Delivery: Does the Postman Have to Ring at All—The
Current State of the Delivery Requirement for Valid Gifts, 31 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 357
(1996).
162. See Ronald W. Polston, Mineral Ownership Theory: Doctrine in Disarray, 70 N.D. L.
Rev. 541, 561–62 (1994) (“[T]itle, being a physical thing, had to have a continuous existence.
There could be no gap in seisin. Title had to be somewhere in someone at all times.” (footnote
omitted)).
163. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Security Interests Under Article 8
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 557, 579 (1990).
164. See Arrun˜ada, supra note 110, at 18–24.
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property, cars, boats, airplanes, water rights, mining claims, security inter-
ests, and intellectual property rights.165 A recordation system refers to a cen-
tral depository in which evidence of previous transactions is collected and
made available for inspection. A registration system, such as the Torrens
titling system for land, goes a step further, setting up a centralized clearing-
house that actually makes a definitive determination of rights holding. Rec-
ordation and registration are both responses to the problems that mutual
exclusivity creates. They make it easier to ascertain who has valid claims on
any given resource—recordation by providing the materials that enable par-
ties to solve title chain problems more easily and registration by solving the
problems for them. The purpose of these systems is to prevent the award of
conflicting rights in the same asset.
These sorts of devices are ubiquitous in the world of property, but they
are basically unheard of in other areas of law like contract and tort. Indeed,
the point at which they enter the picture in the contractual context—se-
cured transactions and bankruptcy—is the point at which contract claims
are converted into actual property entitlements in specific assets. Although
the cost of borrowing is substantially affected by the ease with which a credi-
tor can monitor the activities of a borrowing firm, there are no central regis-
tries wherein one can investigate all of a corporation’s contractual rights and
obligations akin to the registries that determine ownership of each share of
its stock.
We take for granted that these mechanisms exist in the property context.
For valuable assets, they seem like an obviously sensible improvement over a
world dependent on tests like physical possession to provide assurance of
clear title. But the question is why these devices are so sensible—why are
they needed and why only for property? The answer is that they are re-
sponses to the very real problem of competing third-party claims with which
property is centrally concerned.
3. Things and Negative Rights
The previous literature on property has drawn attention to two basic
features of property entitlements: they are defined in important part with
reference to discrete “things,”166 and they impose duties that are almost
always negative in character in the sense that they require that someone
165. A particularly interesting example is the recordation of stockholding in a share regis-
try, with sub-claims maintained by intermediaries in the elaborate system of indirect holding
set up by the UCC. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 50 Duke
L.J. 1541, 1547–48 (2001).
166. See Smith, supra note 5, at 1691–92. The idea that property entails a right to a
“thing” is sometimes controversial, though for reasons that are not relevant to this discussion
(namely, that a right to a thing is often taken to suggest that the right is absolute in the
Blackstonian sense). The point here is simply that it is not sensible to talk about an individual
property entitlement without talking about the specific resource it concerns.
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refrain from doing something, rather than perform some particular ac-
tion.167 The mutual exclusivity principle helps account for both of these. The
two work in tandem to simplify the process of ensuring that rights do not
conflict.
First, the individual things that are used as the starting point in de-
lineating particular property entitlements are constituted so as to be mutu-
ally exclusive of one another. If one looks at a map of the plots of land in a
particular neighborhood—any neighborhood anywhere—the parcels within
it are drawn so as not to cover the same ground; Whiteacre does not start
until Blackacre ends.168 This is equally true for common and public spaces.
Each parcel is distinct from every other.169
The use of negative rights completes this arrangement.170 It is generally
much harder to bound rights to positive performance than rights to have
someone refrain from doing something because rights to positive perform-
ance have no natural stopping point. In consequence, positive obligations
(“You must do X” and “You must do Y”) are more likely to conflict with one
another than negative obligations (“You must not do X” and “You must not
do Y”). I have a negative duty to A, to B, to C, and to millions of others not
to trespass on their property, and those duties can be satisfied at once
through the same course of action. Just now, while I was typing the previous
sentence, I managed to discharge all of them. If, however, I have an obliga-
tion to help A, B, and C develop their respective properties, helping A will at
167. Penner, supra note 5, at 71; see also Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13
Cornell L.Q. 8, 12–13 (1927) (“[T]he essence of private property is always the right to ex-
clude others. The law does not guarantee me the physical or social ability of actually using
what it calls mine.”).
168. See Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, Land Demarcation Systems, in Research Hand-
book on the Economics of Property Law, supra note 141, at 257, 292.
169. In the intellectual property literature, significant attention has been given to the issue
of overlapping legal protection, as, for example, where one inventor develops an improvement
to an earlier patented invention. The earlier inventor is said to hold a “blocking patent” in the
follow-on invention, since the follow-on cannot be used without using the underlying technol-
ogy in the original invention it improves upon. See generally Robert Merges, Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 75
(1994). Even so, the notional res used to structure and define the follow-on patent is distinct
from the res used to structure the earlier one, much as the second floor of a building is distinct
from the first, even if it cannot be used without passing through the first. The point is that
complementary goods can still constitute conceptually separate things. If one person owns a
hammer and another owns a nail, they will need to come to an agreement in order to make
use of their respective things, but it is still the case that the two things are regarded as distinct
objects. To analogize to another system of legal domains, we would not say that Kansas over-
laps with Nebraska because someone straddling the border between them is subject to both
states’ laws.
170. Assertions about purely “negative” rights are a source of considerable controversy in
the context of rights against the government. See generally David P. Currie, Positive and Nega-
tive Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 864 (1986). However, so far as I am aware, the
idea that property holders are not ordinarily entitled to compel others to help them use their
property is not a matter of particular disagreement. Indeed, it is taken for granted and seldom
even recognized. To be clear, this is true only for claim-rights against others, not privileges of
use, which may indeed be positive. See Hohfeld, supra note 58, at 30.
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some point come at the expense of helping B and C. It is one thing not to
impede A’s plans to construct a house on her land, but quite another to have
to help her build it. After all, there are only so many hours in the day. The
initially separate dominions delineated in terms of distinct things are no
longer separate once positive rights enter the picture. Allowing entitlements
to impose only duties of abstention on others thus makes it much easier to
delineate rights in a way that avoids overlap and conflict.171 In short, mutual
exclusivity helps explain other fundamental aspects of how property entitle-
ments are structured.
C. The Information Cost Thesis
One of the most important developments in the literature on property
in recent years is the emergence of the view that property law confronts and
responds to high information costs, a view most closely associated with the
work of Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith.172 These accounts, however, have
in important respects given a misleading view of the source of the informa-
tion costs in property law, associating them with trespassory issues when
they often stem from titling questions.173 Titling problems, a product of
property law’s mutually exclusive structure, are particularly informationally
taxing, and many of the features of property law that Merrill, Smith, and
others have sought to explain as strategies to reduce information costs are in
fact directed to issues pertaining to title. At the same time, however, mutual
exclusivity also provides some independent justification for some of these
features of property law, without needing to bring information costs into the
picture.
Merrill and Smith first set out their information cost thesis in a trio of
articles, beginning with an exploration of the numerus clausus principle in
property law.174 The numerus clausus refers to a general tendency to limit the
types of property arrangements that can be established to a set menu of legal
forms, the effect of which is to make property entitlements less customizable
171. Cf. Bartlett v. Pullen, 586 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Me. 1991) (finding no danger that con-
flicting claims to the same central asset would implicate recording act policies where parties’
respective claims derive from separate deeds to “two separate and mutually exclusive parcels”).
172. See Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers
for Merrill and Smith, 8 Econ J. Watch 215, 218 (2011) (“Merrill and Smith’s writings have
permanently altered legal academic thinking about the nature of private property.”); Lee Anne
Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. Tort L., no. 2, art. 3, 54 https://www.degruyter.com/
downloadpdf/j/jtl.2011.4.2/jtl.2011.4.2.1114/jtl.2011.4.2.1114.pdf [https://perma.cc/TU3E-
J372] (stating that Merrill and Smith’s “approach has increasingly set the terms of property
theory discourse”); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and
Patent, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 231, 249 (2014); Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle
for Intellectual Property, 80 Tenn. L. Rev. 235, 265–85 (2013); Meredith M. Render, Complex-
ity in Property, 81 Tenn. L. Rev. 79, 96 (2013); Van Houweling, supra note 16, at 897.
173. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 16, at 55.
174. Id.; Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, supra note 5; Merrill & Smith,
What Happened, supra note 23.
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than contractual ones.175 For example, Merrill and Smith observed, it has
been held that a leasehold can be created for a defined period of time like a
year or a month but not for “the duration of the war.”176 Merrill and Smith
hypothesized that this limitation reflected a perceived need to standardize
property entitlements. Although standardization diminishes the ability to
tailor rights to fit individual needs, it can lower the cost of acquiring infor-
mation by reducing everyone else’s need to watch out for and to interpret
unusual legal arrangements. In their influential account, Merrill and Smith
argued that there is more standardization in property than in contract law
because “property rights are in rem[ and] all those who might violate prop-
erty rights, accidentally or not, must know what they are supposed to re-
spect.”177 In other words, because property imposes duties on the whole
world, it is harder to communicate their content and therefore the message
has to be kept simple and uniform from one right to the next.178
The wide set of people who are subjected to the duties a property right
imposes does offer a reason to use relatively coarse and acontextual rules in
delimiting the scope of those duties. But that principle isn’t just true for
property; it holds for any private law rule of general application, like the law
of battery or doctrines governing the formation of contracts (as opposed to
175. See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 16, at 4. But see Glen O.
Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449, 1484 (2004) (challenging
Merrill and Smith’s account).
176. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 16, at 11–12; see, e.g., Nat’l
Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1951).
177. Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 16, at 32 (“An indefinite set of
types of rights will raise the cost of preventing violations through investigation of rights.”).
178. See Merrill & Smith, What Happened, supra note 23, at 387. As examples of the
numerus clausus, Merrill and Smith gave the system of estates in land, various forms of concur-
rent interests, nonpossessory interests (easements and servitudes), interests in personal prop-
erty, and types of intellectual property rights. See Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization,
supra note 16, at 12–20. Of these, only the last seems primarily to concern the existence of any
private rights and thus the duties applicable to strangers, as opposed to the manner in which
the rights are carved up among various right holders. Merrill and Smith occasionally referred
to information costs associated with acquiring property rights, in addition to those associated
with the need to avoid violating the rights of others. See, e.g., id. at 27; Thomas W. Merrill, The
Property Prism, 8 Econ J. Watch 247, 250 (2011). But the focus of their argument about
property focused on its “in rem” character, understood to refer to the large and indefinite
group of duty holders a property right entails. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, What Happened,
supra note 23, at 386–87; Merrill & Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, supra note 5, at
789. Merrill and Smith originally distinguished contract law by arguing that property involves
higher information costs because “the adoption of idiosyncratic property rights has an impact
not only on the originating parties and potential successors in interest, but also on other
market participants.” Merrill & Smith, Optimal Standardization, supra note 16, at 44. But
idiosyncratic contracts also have an impact on others seeking to form contracts of their own. If
all contracts meant the same thing, it would be much easier to draft them, though such a
regime would obviously entail other, greater costs. The immediate problem of information
costs arises not simply because customization allows for an information cost externality, but
because that externality magnifies the significantly higher information costs that arise from
allowing the transfer of assets, with their attendant notice difficulties.
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the content of individual contractual obligations, which are generally cus-
tomizable). More to the point, the claim has little to do with the class of
people whose informational burden might be lightened by the legal practices
they associate with numerus clausus. As many, including Merrill and Smith,
have observed, part of the genius of property law is that the content of prop-
erty duties imposed on “the whole world” is unaffected by the identity or
characteristics of the people who hold the rights. A stranger does not need
to know whether a car parked on the street is rented or owned, much less
who the renter or owner is, to know not to take or damage it.179 Yet it is
information about the identity of the right holder, not the substantive con-
tent of the rights, that is addressed by the doctrines Merrill and Smith use to
illustrate the numerus clausus. The term of a lease (“for the duration of the
war”) determines the point in time when rights revert from one property
holder to another. It has no bearing on the duties that the wider world must
respect. As articulated, the argument that the numerus clausus makes it eas-
ier for strangers to figure out the content of their obligations does not add
up.180
An explanation of the numerus clausus grounded in information costs is
still quite plausible, but on somewhat different terms.181 An idiosyncratic
property right like a lease with an unusual term doesn’t make it any harder
for strangers to know what counts as a trespass, but it does make it harder
for those implicated by titling issues to determine whose claim prevails over
whose. Would-be purchasers of an apartment building, for instance, may
find it harder to determine just what sorts of encumbrances they might en-
counter in evaluating any given property if leaseholds come in an elaborate
set of different configurations. The problem is rooted in mutual exclusivity:
because the current owner of a building cannot convey the building to a
purchaser free of any leases beyond a certain date while at the same time
creating leases of indefinite duration, there is a conflict. The lessee’s and the
179. Merrill & Smith, supra note 27, at 1853–54.
180. This is not to deny that other aspects of property law, such as the use of thing-
boundaries to define property duties, do reduce information costs in the way Merrill and
Smith claim, and information costs would certainly be expected to increase the more that
scope of protection against outside interference is allowed to vary for different resources.
181. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have challenged Merrill and Smith’s ac-
count of the numerus clausus, arguing that it serves as a way “to facilitate verification of owner-
ship of the rights offered for conveyance,” rather than “communication among persons who
transact in rights.” Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verifica-
tion: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S373, S374
(2002). While they are right to focus on problems concerning the enforcement of property
rights against subsequent transferees, in their account, the numerus clausus simply serves as the
starting point for a set of rules about the sort of notice that must be given when complete
ownership of an asset is divided. It is not about reducing uncertainty generally—that is, for
other potential transactors interested in other, unrelated properties—by either reducing the
likelihood of encountering an idiosyncratic property arrangement or formalizing the language
used to construct more elaborate property interests. My point, by contrast, is that the informa-
tion cost thesis must be modified to recognize that titling problems are its principal source,
but it remains plausible nevertheless.
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purchaser’s rights are incompatible as property rights. Stated differently, to
the extent the numerus clausus reflects a desire to standardize property enti-
tlements in order to make it easier to assess, measure, and communicate
them, the explanation has to do with the way property rights necessarily
preclude competing claims. By ensuring that mutually exclusive rights come
in a limited set of packages, the numerus clausus reduces the cost of investi-
gating the risks associated with a right that might be invalid because of
someone else’s superior claim.
The more general argument that property law has to deal with particu-
larly acute information cost problems and is pervaded by strategies to re-
duce those costs does make sense when the special problem of titling is
considered. Titling questions present systematically heavy and intractable in-
formational burdens. In part, the issues are more case specific, less easily
resolved by general rule. Even if the law of trespass were more flexible and
standard-like than it typically is,182 it would still be amenable to some gener-
alization. If a given act under a given set of circumstances bearing a given
relationship to Blackacre is a trespass to Blackacre, then in principle the
same act under the same circumstances bearing the same relationship to
Whiteacre should be a trespass to Whiteacre. Title questions, by contrast, are
intrinsically factual. Ordinarily, knowing who owns Blackacre tells you liter-
ally nothing about who owns Whiteacre.183 To be sure, there are questions of
law that must be worked out to maintain a title system, but in most cases,
ascertaining whose claims to a given asset are valid will be less a matter of
legal uncertainty than of ascertaining the raw facts to which that law is to be
applied. To put the point more concretely, the question that will come up
again and again won’t be whether a security interest must be recorded to
defeat a subsequent purchaser’s claim but whether an interest has been
recorded.
Besides being property-specific, the title issue increases information
costs in at least one and often two other respects. In circumstances where
one person can acquire property from another who is not supposed to be
able to transfer the entitlement—for example, in cases where a good faith
purchaser prevails over an earlier transferee—information costs are high be-
cause the current holder of an entitlement has to monitor the conduct of
others, such as prior owners, trustees, or bailees, to ensure that the entitle-
ment isn’t lost. In situations where the opposite approach is followed and
the earlier transferee prevails over the later one, a similar problem arises
since a would-be transferee’s rights also depend on the actions of strangers,
though now the strangers are prior purchasers rather than subsequent ones.
Here, however, there is the added problem that the inquiry is historical,
requiring an investigation into the “chain of title,” a series of transactions
among strangers stretching into the past. If C’s transfer to D depends on
whether B’s transfer to C was valid, which in turn depends on whether A’s
182. See Depoorter, supra note 100, at 1092–93.
183. For an important exception, see Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Owner-
ship, 1 J. Legal Analysis 459 (2009).
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transfer to B was valid, the costs of uncovering the necessary information
will be potentially very high—and not just in a few instances but across the
board. These costs can be reduced through devices like recordation, market-
able title acts, and rules based on physical possession, but they cannot be
avoided.184
In short, it is mutual exclusivity and the problem of titling that accounts
for much of the high information costs that property law confronts. As a
closing thought, however, it should also be noted that the mutual exclusivity
principle supplies an independent justification for some of the features the
information cost thesis has sought to explain. The formalistic system of es-
tates in land might be justified as a way to reduce information costs, but it
can certainly be quite bewildering and in some cases undoubtedly acts as a
trap for the unwary. The idea that the system makes the law easier to under-
stand might come as a surprise to many first-year law students charged with
mastering its intricate technicalities (a reversion, not a reverter?!), to say
nothing of the nonspecialist public. By contrast, a straightforward case can
be made that the standardization of estates helps implement the mutual ex-
clusivity principle because it ensures that different temporal pieces will fit
together without overlap, even if it is more than a little complicated. The
system is consistent with the general conception of property that sees it as a
system for allocating portions of a fixed sum of legal authority. Similar argu-
ments could be made about other property doctrines and features that have
been said to be designed to reduce information costs. Indeed, such an argu-
ment has already been made about one such set of features, the negative,
thing-based structure of property entitlements. In short, some of property’s
superficial formalism may simply be a reflection of its underlying conceptual
form.185
Conclusion
Property is a basic building block in any comprehensive normative sys-
tem. Superficially, its structure seems quite simple, which is altogether fit-
ting given the work it is called upon to do, but its surface appearance masks
a more complex story about its underlying mechanisms of operation. Exclu-
sivity is one of the core features of property invoked by an array of theorists
to describe the way property operates. But it turns out property is exclusive
in multiple senses and to differing extents. And it further turns out that the
most significant form of exclusivity from the standpoint of how property is
184. See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1353, 1355–57 (1982).
185. Moreover, the root causes of property’s adherence to that form may help explain the
relatively formal characteristics of property without needing information costs as a middle
step in the argument. Information cost analysis tends to take the in rem structure of property
as a given. But it may well be that property isn’t simply made more formal because it is in rem
but that it is made more formal and it is in rem for the same underlying reason—to give
property holders confidence, or security, in their legal position.
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constituted isn’t any of the versions of exclusivity generally assumed in de-
bates about property, but the mutual exclusivity principle discussed here.
Understanding property as a system of mutually exclusive rights de-
scribes property most universally and captures the difference between prop-
erty entitlements and their closest legal analogues. Mutual exclusivity is able
to describe what is property-like about entitlements like mortgages, ease-
ments, and ownership of bank accounts. It helps explain the origin of so
many of the peculiar institutional features that surround property law, like
recording mechanisms and possession doctrines. It gives a better under-
standing of the origins of information cost problems in property law, draw-
ing a critical distinction between trespass and title issues. This final
distinction is vital to understanding the multiple facets of property. The ten-
dency to conflate questions about the strength of property rights and ques-
tions about the identity of the person who holds them tends not only to
confuse our understanding of property but to distort it, since the conse-
quence is often to view everything through the lens of trespass, with its
themes of public against private. The life of property consists as much in
titling problems as trespass ones, and it is only by recognizing the complica-
tions associated with a system designed to disallow conflicting entitlements
that this other aspect of property law can be fully appreciated.
